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Background: Decision-making practices are complex and within the process 
ethical dilemmas can present themselves. When a healthcare professional feels 
unable to provide the care that their ethical code deems ‘best’ for a patient, 
moral distress can arise. Moral distress is a phenomenon originating in, and 
most explored within, nursing; it captured the compromised ethical integrity 
nurses experienced when they were institutionally constrained from acting in 
accordance with their professional values. This study is believed to be the first 
in the United Kingdom to explore the concept of moral distress with Clinical 
Psychologists. 
Methods: A Thematic Analysis was carried out on data collected from semi-
structured interviews with 14 Clinical Psychologists working to provide mental 
health support to adults in the United Kingdom’s ‘socialised’ healthcare system, 
the National Health Service.  
Results: Three superordinate and six subordinate themes emerged from data 
analysis. These spoke to the patterns in participants’ experiences of ‘Being in 
Services’ and the constraints on their attempts to ‘Do the Right Thing’ whilst 
observing ‘Cultural Harm’. A theme concerning ‘Power’, it’s ‘Top-Down’ 
enforcement, and the participants’ attempts at ‘Resistance’ followed. The final 
theme spoke to the role of ‘Professional Identity’ and the consequences of 
morally distressing experiences, such as the intent to leave a role or the NHS 
itself. Mechanisms for managing the values conflicts are also identified.  
Conclusions: Clinical Psychologists in this study were regularly constrained 
from working in alignment with their personal and professional values by 
institutional practices. The impact of this on the participants’ own psychological 
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1. CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
This chapter outlines the core components of this research project: the 
complexities of decision-making in healthcare, the presence of ethical 
dilemmas within this process, and the potential production of ‘moral distress’ 
as a result. The relevance to clinical psychology is introduced, including the 
impact of the current National Health Service (NHS) context. A scoping 
review of the literature on moral distress is presented and what we do not 





Decision-making in healthcare is situated in the broader context of 
human decision-making. The extensive literature around this topic 
includes work by Tversky and Kahneman whose 1981 paper explored 
the framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. In both daily life 
and the social sciences, explanations and predictions of people's 
decisions are often based on the presumption of human rationality. 
Debates about the definition of rationality continue, but a consensus 
generally exists around the need for choices to be coherent and 
consistent to be considered rational. However, there are ‘decision 
problems’ in which these requirements are systematically violated which 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) understand through “the psychological 
principles that govern the perception of decision problems and the 
evaluation of options” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453). Key to this is 
recognition that a decision-maker’s frame is in part controlled by their 
formulation of a problem and in part by their habits, the norms they have 
adopted, and their personal characteristics.  
Tversky and Kahneman’s studies with university students and faculty, 
and with physicians too, identified a common phenomenon: “choices 
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involving gains are often risk-adverse and choices involving losses are 
often risk-taking” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981, p. 453); the decision-
problems were identical but their differing frames produced a significant 
shift, a reversal in preference. Tversky and Kahneman (1981) concluded 
that the psychological concepts that influence the understanding of 
decision problems and the calculation of probability and outcomes induce 
predictable variations in choice when the same problem is phrased in 
different ways. Reversals of choice can be seen in decisions concerning 
monetary implications, both hypothetical and real, as well as concerns 
about the loss of human lives. The dependency of preferences on the 
wording of decision problems calls into question the idea of rational 
choice. Relatedly, making choices in ‘risky contexts’, when the 
consequences cannot be known means mentally accounting for the 
acceptability level of outcomes with varying probabilities – a negative 
outcome being perceived as an expected cost, or an ‘uncompensated 
loss’, for example (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Additionally, this loss 
aversion has been identified as one explanation for the general bias in 
systems which favour the status quo (Kahneman, 1991).  
In a healthcare context there is a need to manage uncertainty during 
decision-making processes, and necessary trade-offs in doing so. 
Making judgements under uncertainty, however, generally calls for a 
reliance on heuristics (‘mental shortcuts’) and bias (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974), which is often economical and typically effective but 
can lead to systematic, and foreseeable, errors. The framing of choices 
again is impactful, informing someone considering a medical intervention 
that they have a 10% chance of death is meaningfully different to a 90% 
chance of survival (Kahneman, 1991). 
Also not considered in the rationality theory of choice is the role played 
by conflict during decision-making. When a decision-maker does not 
know how to navigate the cost-benefit, value-risk trade-off, or the 
analysis of instantaneous satisfaction versus future discomfort, conflict 
naturally arises for them (Tversky & Shafir, 1992). Being uncertain about 
the implications of one's decisions complicates conflict resolution, which 
is further disrupted by the expectation of dissonance or regret. Tversky 
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and Shafir (1992) therefore argue that conflict not only affects the 
psychological condition of the decision-maker, but also influences the 
actual choice made. 
Gigerenzer (1996) explored the difficulties people have with 
understanding and utilising probability in decision-making and advocated 
for a heuristic approach to decision-making in medicine (Marewski & 
Gigerenzer, 2012), teaching physicians effective heuristics – ‘simple’ 
decision strategies. The heuristics-and-biases framework described 
above suggests people regularly make systematic errors through their 
decisions and judgment of probability, Marewski and Gigerenzer (2012) 
meanwhile proffer the ‘fast-and-frugal heuristics’ framework for 
understanding how reliance on this simplicity can produce smart action. 
In their framework, rational thinking occurs when correspondence criteria 
are met, rather than the coherence criteria named in the ‘normative’ 
definitions of rationality that Tversky and Kahneman spoke to. Marewski 
and Gigerenzer (2012) noted a tendency of physicians in the United 
States to employ a defensive heuristic - “err on the safe side” – in fear of 
litigation, and ultimately over-diagnose and ‘overtreat’, engaging in 
practices that are not the best options for their patients. They argued that 
a change to the system and the environment can support physicians in 
relying on heuristics that benefit the patient, such as the use of fast-and-
frugal decision-trees. In the ‘real world’ and in medicine, where 
uncertainty reigns, people can and should, they say, rely on heuristics 
which can make transparent, accurate decisions, using less resources 
than complex, information-saturated strategies. Support for the utility of 
fast-and-frugal approaches to decision making includes work by Smith & 
Gilhooly (2006) on responses to ‘depression’ presentations in primary 
care.  
Overall, the human decision-making literature tends to suggest that 
people use (attend to, gather, and interpret) information in a style that 
confirms their decisions about others, rather than examining them. 
Psychotherapists are not expected to be free of this trap, indeed studies 
have identified a similar reliance on confirmatory strategies (Pfeiffer et 
al., 2000). The ‘Practice Guidelines’ published by the British 
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Psychological Society (BPS) in 2017 state aims around defining good 
practice for all psychologists and offering guidance for decision-making; 
they add a caveat that no guidance document can take the place of a 
psychologist’s own professional judgement (British Psychological 
Society, 2017). Within their guidance however there is a reflective 
section on the “various competing biases” (BPS, 2017, p. 11) that can 
influence decision-making which psychologists should be aware of, so 
that they may “think through dilemmas” (BPS, 2017, p.11). These biases 
include confirmation bias, dissonance, and loss aversion as above; the 
work of Tversky and Kahneman (1974) is cited. Beyond cognitive biases, 
the Guidelines also note the influence of motivation: “the original reasons 
for undertaking the profession may change or be challenged due to 
fatigue or experience within the profession which may affect the 
psychologist’s viewpoint” (BPS, 2017, p. 11); a recognition, however 
brief, that psychologists’ experiences of clinical practice and decision-
making can be taxing and dually impacting.  
1.1.1. Evidence-Based Practice 
Decision-making in the NHS operates on multiple levels, beyond 
the individual intervention to departmental, organisational, 
management levels; professional (influence of research), societal 
(influence of the media), and regulatory and commissioning levels. 
Funding and resource allocation are issues that are often 
prioritised and create conflict.  
The National Institute for health and Care Excellence (NICE) state 
that their recommendations arise from an analysis of the benefit-
harm trade-off referred to above, alongside their judgement of 
evidence for interventions (National Institute for Health and Care 
Excellence, 2021). They too make note of the level of certainty 
afforded to their decision-making. It is of course imperative that we 
consider the hierarchy of evidence NICE propagates and how it 
reflects the economic priorities above. The British epidemiologist 
Archie Cochrane is often cited as the originator of what has come 
to be known as Evidence-Based Practice (EBP). Cochrane (1972) 
argued that the limited nature of healthcare resources requires 
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their allocation be determined by the evaluated effectiveness of 
interventions and services.  
Randomised Controlled Trials (RCTs) are often said to be the 
‘gold standard’ in clinical research; in these RCTs interventions 
are assessed under tightly controlled, ideal circumstances. What 
is then not known is how effective these interventions will be in 
real, clinical settings (Cartwright & Munro, 2010) leading to a 
divide between research and practice. Subsequently, the 
dominance of EBP and its reliance on RCTs in mental health (MH) 
provision has prioritised what is valued by commissioners and 
service-providers, and in doing so has limited service-user choice 
and autonomy.   
Facts and data are intended to aid us in making sensible 
decisions, but we must consider the basis on which these 
knowledge claims are produced, and the value-laden nature of 
their conception. Not all evidence is equal, a hierarchy exists here 
in an exercise of power. “Evidence-based medicine … has and 
confers both epistemic and moral authority” (Kerridge, 2010, p. 
365) but we must consider whose values and interests are served 
by EBP, and the potentially compromising experience of providing 
healthcare dictated by EBP.  
‘Shared decision making’ has also been named as one of the six 
key parts of the NHS Long Term Plan’s aim around personalised 
care (NHS England, 2019). However, what may be the best option 
for an individual patient may not be an economically viable 
decision for the healthcare service. Similarly, whilst collective 
thought and shared decision-making within a multidisciplinary 
team is often encouraged with regard to the input of multiple 
perspectives and knowledges, it does not necessarily ensure 
moral validity within a decision-making process; teams may reach 
a consensus, but the decision still may not be in the patient’s best 
interest, resource prioritisation dominating for example.  
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While classical approaches to understanding decision-making 
tend to focus on rationality and information processing, it is 
important to recognise that in many areas of life (not just 
healthcare) decisions have a moral and ethical context and 
consequences. Kahneman (1991) acknowledges that the 
psychological study of decision making and judgement under 
uncertainty has preferred to invoke cognitive or psychophysical 
terminology, whilst the emotional and social factors of these 
experiences have been relatively neglected. In practice, decision-
making processes, morality, and emotion can be considered to 
collide during what we refer to as ethical dilemmas. 
 
1.2. Ethical Dilemmas 
 
When I speak of morality in this thesis, I am referring to the principles 
that govern the distinction between right and wrong, or good and bad 
behaviour. Conversations concerning the moral principles that govern a 
person's behaviour or the conduct of an activity are aided by ethical 
rules. Ethical clinical practice is said to be core to the foundations of all 
healthcare professions, with the overarching commonality being to do no 
harm and centre the welfare of patients, but the integration of personal 
and professional values can be a complex one (Kimball, 2018), 
contending with the multifaceted trade-offs identified above. Ethical 
principles in practice are concerned with protecting the rights, dignity and 
welfare of patients and service-users. Much of these principles grew from 
previous abuses and unethical research carried out by public health 
services (such as the ‘Tuskegee Syphilis Study’, Kampmeier, 1974); by 
physicians (such as those involved in Nazi human experimentation, 
Annas & Grodin, 1992; Strous, 2007); and psychologists (such as the 
use of deception by Milgram, 1963).   
Colnerud (1997) invites us to make distinctions between ethical 
problems, ethical conflicts, and ethical dilemmas. An ethical problem 
arises when an immediate solution to a situation is not found but can be 
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through assistance. An ethical conflict occurs when two or more interests 
collide, a solution requiring compromise between these, and an individual 
perceives a violation of their sense of right and wrong (Moser, 1988). An 
ethical dilemma entails deciding between two or more options, each of 
which has less-than-ideal moral consequences. (Rathert et al., 2016). 
In a workplace, the ethical environment reflects the organisation’s 
“procedures, policies, and practices with moral consequences” (Martin & 
Cullen, 2006, p.177). Norms and standards for ethical decision-making 
and behaviour permeate expectations for workers and the ethical 
environment of the organisation impacts which ethical issues are 
prioritised and what criteria should be employed during ethical decision-
making. Work by Rathert et al. (2009) found that nurses who perceived 
their work environment to be a caring and ethical one reported increased 
psychological safety and organisational commitment.  
It is important to recognise that the differing professions operating in our 
healthcare system each belong to differing regulatory and professional 
bodies (such as the General Medical Council; Nurse and Midwifery 
Council; Health and Care Professions Council; British Association for 
Counselling and Psychotherapy; BPS), and each of these hold their own 
principles and guidelines their clinicians should abide by. However, these 
may not always be consistent, and prioritisation of issues is likely to vary.  
Indeed, moral conflicts can arise due to differing, and at times conflicting, 
values and perspectives held between members of a team but also 
patients and their families (Landau, 2000). These differences will then 
impact the process of choosing a course of action, contributing to ethical 
dilemmas, where certain values and perspectives ‘win out’. These ethical 
dilemmas can act as precursors to moral distress (Fourie, 2015).  
As the largest clinical workforce in the NHS (The Nuffield Trust, 2020) 
and worldwide, nurses also dominate the literature on clinical ethical 
dilemmas. This may be due to their availability, their exposure to distress 
due to hands-on daily patient contact, and/or concerns about recruitment 
and retention. Intensive Care Units (ICUs) are often the focus of studies 
in this area, where nurses are regularly exposed to ethical conflict 
particularly in regard to administering ineffective treatments like 
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analgesia (Falcó-Pegueroles et al., 2016). These researchers designate 
ethical conflict an internal problem but highlight the significant influence 
of environmental conditions and found that when nurses are involved in 
decision-making they are protected from such ethical conflicts. A scoping 
review of the ethical elements in nurses’ prioritisation of care by Suhonen 
et al. (2018) found that when prioritisation involves rationing nurses can 
compromise their patients’ right to healthcare and this conflicts with the 
nurses’ values, personal and professional, leading to consequences for 
patient and nurse.  
In psychiatric nursing, Lützén et al. (2010) identified an association 
between moral sensitivity, moral climate, and moral stress having 
collected questionnaire data from 49 psychiatric nurses in Sweden. The 
environmental moral climate contributed to these nurses’ experiences of 
moral stress, stress which was mediated positively or negatively by moral 
support. They therefore encourage us to consider clinical ethical issues 
through a focus upon healthcare structures and management, and the 




Burnout is a widely acknowledged issue in the public services sector and 
has been validated as a concept over the years through the production of 
standardised measurements (Malach-Pines, 2005; Maslach et al., 1996). 
Occupational stress and resultant burnout are often spoken of in the 
context of increasing workloads, staff shortages, and reducing resources 
(Rossi et al., 2012). These experiences generally co-exist and produce 
physical and psychological exhaustion, disassociation from work and job 
dissatisfaction (Kim et al., 2011; Nissly et al., 2005).  
An integrative review (Gribben & Semple, 2021) of the factors 
contributing to burnout for nurses working in the NHS’ oncology services 
identified two broad themes: an ‘inability to thrive’, workplace burnout 
originating from organisational barriers; and ‘personal perspectives 
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influencing burnout’. The demands of an ever-increasing workload, lack 
of time to provide good care, and staff shortages contributed strongly to 
the first theme, as well as the state of the workplace culture. The second 
theme spoke to inconsistent findings on the relationship between 
individual demographics, personal attributes, and burnout. There were 
also inseparable influences of the oncology context on these nurses’ 
burnout experience. The authors conclude that organisations should 
share the responsibility for confronting burnout, but the suggested 
strategies do centre individualised ‘wellness’ in the name of resilience.  
O’Connor et al. (2018) conducted a systematic review and meta-analysis 
of burnout in MH professionals. They identified workload and work 
relationships as key determinants for a burnout experience that 
incorporated high levels of emotional exhaustion (40%); 
depersonalisation (22%); and a lowered sense of accomplishment (19%). 
Factors appearing to protect these professionals from burnout included 
clinical autonomy, regular supervision, cultural fairness, and role clarity. 
Interestingly, community mental health team (CMHT) staff appeared 
more vulnerable to burnout than those operating in more specialist 
teams; it is suggested this is due to specialist staff experiencing greater 
autonomy.  
There are conceptual difficulties to be noted however, and questions 
have been raised as to the distinction between the state of burnout and 
clinical depression, for example; a review into this overlap by Bianchi et 
al. (2015) attempts to speak to this. Following a systematic literature 
review, they argue that the empirical evidence for burnout as a distinctive 
entity is inconsistent and its characterisation has been impeded by a lack 
of clinical observation. They suggest the instruments developed for 
measuring burnout (referenced above) have contributed to the confusion.  
Having reviewed the models for and issues related to decision-making, 
one notices necessary trade-offs as points of tension, particularly where 
there is conflict with professional codes of ethics and individual moral 




1.4. Moral Distress 
 
Despite its conceptual ambiguity, burnout talk is common in healthcare 
spaces. A lesser known concept is moral distress. Moral distress (MD) is 
a term originally coined in 1984 by Andrew Jameton, an American 
ethicist. As above, distress amongst healthcare workers is often 
discussed through the concepts of ‘burnout’ and ‘stress’, which Jameton 
acknowledged as relevant but insufficient for what he was concerned 
with. Jameton (1984) more specifically examined the ethics of nursing 
and described MD as arising from situations where a person knows what 
the right thing to do is, but that course of action appears impossible due 
to institutional constraints. An example of nurses being constrained from 
translating moral choice into moral action, compromising their values and 
code of ethics, includes the inability to ensure a patient is comfortable 
due to staffing levels impacting on which tasks take priority during a shift 
(Rodney, 2017).  
Wilkinson (1987) furthered the definition of MD by describing “the 
psychological disequilibrium and negative feeling state” (p. 16) felt by 
nurses in these scenarios. Nathaniel (2002) expanded the concept to 
speak to an embodied, at times painful, experience where a “person is 
aware of a moral problem, acknowledges moral responsibility, and 
makes a moral judgement about the correct action” (p. 9).  When 
healthcare professionals (HCPs) are unable to practise in accordance 
with their ethical standards, they can feel powerless, angry, and guilty 
(Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004; Schwenzer & Wang, 2006). In other words, 
MD arises when personal or institutional factors (values or policies, for 
example) prevent us from taking what we deem to be morally justifiable 
actions (McCarthy & Gastmans, 2015). Zuzelo (2007) encourages us to 
consider that these feelings of guilt, frustration, and anger arising as MD 
often do so because clinicians lack the necessary power or resources to 
respond as they see fit.  
A more recent definition has been provided by Varcoe et al. (2012), who 
refer to “the experience of being seriously compromised as a moral agent 
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in practicing in accordance with accepted professional values and 
standards” (p. 59). A decision reached following a dilemma has 
compromised a person’s professional and/or personal moral integrity, 
and the actions agreed do not align with their individual moral judgement 
of the dilemma, and/or their code of ethics (Fantus et al., 2017). 
Compromised integrity within MD is often associated with burnout and 
the intention to leave a position in healthcare (Hamric et al., 2012; 
Hamric & Blackhall, 2007; Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004; Piers et al., 2012). 
Indeed, the significant physical and emotional experience of MD has 
been linked to the loss of qualified HCPs and career dissatisfaction 
(Hamric, 2000; Pauly et al., 2009). Above and beyond other workplace 
pressures, MD is linked to job dissatisfaction, weariness, and turnover 
(DeTienne et al., 2012).  
MD is said to contextually occur interactionally, between individuals and 
workplaces which are financially constrained and have increasingly ill 
patients, and a workforce that incorporates differing power dynamics 
amongst its personnel (Musto et al., 2015; Varcoe et al., 2012). This is a 
context in which ethical conflicts between clinicians and their 
organisations are rife, and often centre around the impact of scarce 
resources upon patient care, disagreement regarding organisational 
policy and procedure, and a sense of leaders ‘turning a blind eye’ 
(Gaudine et al., 2011). MD can be considered an ‘ethical canary’ 
(Somerville, 2004), warning us something is significantly amiss, in need 
of systematic reform.  
Oliver (2018), a medical consultant, shares their thoughts on how MD 
touches all who work throughout the NHS and cites staff surveys which 
have highlighted declining morale in association with pressure and staff 
shortages. He notes the growing interest in ‘resilience training’ for the 
NHS workforce and is not convinced by this as an evidence-based 
solution, nor as one that adequately responds to what he sees as 
unacceptable working conditions. Oliver suggests that we might begin by 
naming the MD in our system, rather than seeking to hide it or diminish it.  
A few authors have spoken to the potential for MD to do good through 
the prompting of self-reflection and enhanced moral sensitivity (Carse & 
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Rushton, 2017). Tigard (2019) argues that whilst many of the effects of 
MD are undeniably negative, the experience can serve to reveal and 
affirm what matters to us as moral agents and under certain 
circumstances, permit important moral maturation and highlight a 
person’s character. Similarly, improved organisational ethics support is 
posited as an opportunity for workers to learn and grow from their 
experiences of ethical dilemmas and conflicts, should mechanisms such 
as ethics committees be accessible and supported (Rathert et al., 2016). 
Numerous authors have raised concerns about our current lack of 
adequate understanding of MD, it’s conceptualisation and delineation 
(Fourie, 2015; Tigard, 2018). These conceptual demands can and should 
be considered. However, the concept of MD remains worthy of 
investigation, not least because of its tendency to reveal structural issues 
and highlight the political dimensions of professional practices as ethical 
concerns (Weinberg, 2009). The threat to patient safety from the moral 
disengagement of a healthcare system and its clinicians also calls for 
inquiry (Hyatt, 2017). 
Throughout the process of this thesis, the world has been experiencing 
the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). Healthcare has substantially 
changed in this time and the distress of HCPs has been broadcast. 
These HCPs have been facing moral and ethical dilemmas of a 
heightened intensity and frequency. Garros et al. (2021) suspect that 
beyond the challenges of care during COVID-19, HCPs will be 
experiencing MD as resources become scarcer, for example. Pre-
pandemic, the MD literature was saturated with end-of-life conflicts and 
the dilemmas of providing sub-optimal treatment because of a lack of 
resources (a significant, institutional-level constraint). Garros et al. (2021) 
encourage a paradigm shift, moving away from ‘simplifying’ distressed 
HCPs as solely exhausted (in the style of burnout narratives) to consider 
the problematic environments they are being expected to survive.  
In summary, the body of literature on MD has continued to grow over the 
last 40 years as MD has come to be more acknowledged as a problem 
within healthcare settings, posing a threat to the moral integrity and 
wellbeing of clinicians and patients alike, and the quality of services 
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delivered and received. The contents of this empirical research literature 
will be explored later in this chapter.  
1.4.1. Burnout Revisited  
Having introduced MD, it is perhaps useful to revisit burnout and 
consider their similarities and differences. Within the literature, 
burnout is often framed as one consequence of MD (Hamric et al., 
2012; Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004). Other authors have expressed 
concerns that MD may at times be inaccurately categorised as 
occupational stress or burnout (Fantus et al., 2017). Definitions of 
occupational stress do not include reference to ethical dilemmas 
or morally compromising situations, instead they cite “the harmful 
physical and emotional responses that occur when the 
requirements of the job do not match the capabilities, resources, 
or needs of the worker” (National Institute for Occupational Safety 
and Health, 2021, p. 6). Distinctions between burnout and MD 
have been offered in response, burnout identified as an 
experience that does “not entail a lack of ethical integrity or 
personal value incongruence” (Fantus et al., 2017, p. 2284). 
Occupational stress, burnout, and MD may be experienced by 
HCPs because of similar institutional constraints. What 
distinguishes these experiences is the extent to which the 
consequences derive from a moral event; that is, when 
institutional constraints such as funding and workload produce 
ethical dilemmas whereby the resultant decision conflicts with a 
HCPs values (personal and/or professional), or integrity (Fantus et 
al., 2017). 
1.4.2. Moral Efficacy and Moral Courage 
Moral efficacy as a concept is derived from Bandura’s theory of 
self-efficacy (Hannah et al., 2011) and states that beyond the 
influence of moral knowledge and reasoning, moral conduct is 
influenced reciprocally by intrapersonal characteristics, the 
external environment, and specific behaviours that an individual 
selects. Self-efficacy is brought into the discussion on MD by 
14 
 
Rathert et al. (2016) as they believe individuals' ability to 
persevere in the face of hardship is highlighted in this theory. 
Moral efficacy is also argued to be an influencer on moral 
courage, that which supports an individual in converting their 
moral ideals into actions regardless of pressures to be subservient 
(May et al., 2003). A key component of moral courage is what 
Rathert et al. (2016) refer to as moral voice, which they 
differentiate from the concept of feeling psychologically safe to 
speak up to instead the “voice of agency, to act with courage, 
conviction, and capacity” (Edmonson, 2010, p. 4).The general 
notion of moral courage (‘the courage of your convictions’) has 
permeated our culture for some time and it follows that people 
may feel distressed by a perceived failure to speak up around 
something they believe to be wrong.  
 
1.5. Clinical Psychology 
 
The Clinical Psychologist’s (CP’s) role within the NHS’ provision of 
psychological care generally involves clinical practice, research, and 
leadership responsibilities which may all require varied approaches 
(Barkan, 2018). Understanding interpersonal dynamics within care 
organisations, developing shared understandings of complex issues, and 
facilitating multidisciplinary teamwork are all common concerns for CPs 
(Reiss & Kirtchuk, 2009). The ethical dilemmas that CPs face are 
evidently complex. Factors to consider are free and informed consent, 
confidentiality, professional boundaries, competency, cross-cultural 
practices, and social justice (Truscott & Crook, 2004). CPs can turn to 
their professional body’s code of ethics for guidance; here the principles 
and values of the professional community are articulated.  
O’Donohue & Henderson (1999, p. 10) spoke of the “epistemic and 
ethical” duty a psychologist holds and of the imperative need to attain the 
highest possible level of theoretical and empirical knowledge, which must 
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then be utilised in the most ethically appropriate manner (Barkan, 2018). 
This tension between empirical knowledge and ethical practice may 
require more consideration in application once the means of producing 
and disseminating empirical knowledge is deconstructed.  
1.5.1. Power and Knowledge 
Power as a concept in our Western society is defined in terms of 
control; that which has power has the ability to control people and 
things, influence them and exert authority. Many forms of power 
exist: legal power, economic and material power, and coercive 
power to name a few (Johnstone & Boyle, 2018). When a 
profession is closely affiliated with societal knowledge and is 
depended upon by other groups, its ethical practice becomes 
especially relevant (Pettifor, 2004). CPs are certainly such a 
profession, producing knowledge through research and 
disseminating it, often as truth, with their powerful titles as Doctors 
attached; this is one way in which CPs may differ from general 
nurses, for example.  
CPs have amassed valued qualifications, knowledge and 
networks which afford them social and cultural capital, enhanced 
by their titles which denote expertise and status. They have 
access to and can wield ideological power, influencing the control 
of language, meaning, and perspective (Johnstone & Boyle, 
2018). Hagan and Smail (1997) encouraged psychology to 
engage in ‘power-mapping’ to consider the full implications of 
taking seriously the workings of power upon an individual’s social 
environment, how psychological distress can result from social 
power operating upon a person. This power is not created in a 
vacuum, away from clinical psychology, rather clinical psychology 
plays a role in reproducing ideas and concepts, and CPs are not 
immune from experiencing this as people themselves.  
The knowledge CPs have attained through their training is likely to 
include frameworks for understanding human behaviour and 
subsequent distress, such as Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & 
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Turner, 1979), a theory speaking to how people develop a sense 
of who they are based on their group membership(s) and source 
their pride, self-esteem, and sense of socially belonging from 
these groups. People divide into categories, such as castes, 
generations, and races; more relevant to this thesis however may 
be how HCPs might separate into groups of their own: ‘psychiatric 
nurses’, ‘psychiatrists’, and/or ‘psychologists’, ‘ward teams’ and 
‘external consultants’, ‘inpatient’ and ‘outpatient’ staff – an ‘us and 
them’ that intensifies during times of stress or conflict. 
Understanding a theory such as this may afford psychologists the 
ability to make sense of any distress they may feel in their 
occupational setting when they are outside of a dominant group 
and not adhering to the norms of that group, such as practices 
which pathologize and medicate distress.  
Additionally, Ecological System’s Theory (Bronfenbrenner, 1977) 
is taught widely on clinical psychology doctorate courses, 
providing CPs with an understanding of how the influential, 
layered systems within a person’s environment will shape their 
experiences of being in the world. Again, this offers psychologists 
a framework for meaning making regarding what it’s like to be part 
of a system, one which is impacted by others, and why ethical 
dilemmas may present, and then why they may be distressing. 
These theories are simply two examples of the knowledge 
psychologists may be equipped with, which may alter their 
experience of moral distress, how it is felt, understood, and 
managed.  
1.5.2. Values: Personal and Professional 
A person’s own values and moral code are developed and shaped 
through multiple contexts and group memberships. The values 
upheld by one’s family, for example, are likely to influence what 
matters to the self, alongside cultural norms, religious teachings, 
and that which is promoted through media. Children are taught to 
‘do the right thing’, but what this is will likely differ from household 
to household and person to person. ‘Doing the right thing’ is 
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contextual and therefore often subjective. Philosophies and 
principles deployed by psychologists are often influenced by 
Judeo-Christian ethical traditions (Knapp & VandeCreek, 2007), 
which raises questions as to whether it is indeed ethical for 
psychologists to apply the standards of Western morality to clients 
originating from other cultures. As a British, ‘socialised’ healthcare 
system, one might assume that the NHS has been built upon 
Westernised ideas of universal ethics. However, despite two NHS 
HCPs being born and raised within a Western culture, they may 
still have individual differences in their personal values and have 
different responses to a patient who discloses the wish to 
terminate a pregnancy based on differences in religious beliefs or 
personal experiences as parents, for example, despite a 
professional code perhaps advocating for the same response from 
both HCPs. Beliefs vary even with the same culture (Knapp & 
VandeCreek, 2007), and the boundary between personal and 
professional may not always be as distinct as desired.  
Hadjistavropoulos et al. (2003) compared the ethical ideologies of 
(Canadian) psychologists with those of physicians and found the 
psychologists to be influenced by their code – more so than 
physicians – and less influenced by the views of their family or 
peers or religion. Psychology also exhibited a greater tone of duty 
(over utility) than medicine did. The researchers say that the 
reduced relativism noted in psychologists may support more 
consistent ethical decision making. However, despite professional 
ethics in general being produced through internal consensus, 
individual psychologists are ultimately alone when making moral 
choices in clinical practice. Different professions may therefore 
experience MD differently, through the violation of values based 
upon different personal and/or professional perspectives.   
Alongside the Judeo-Christian ways of thinking which are 
privileged within the NHS context, the dominance of EBP (as 
spoken to earlier in this chapter) has implications for how clinical 
psychology has, as a profession, presented and developed itself. 
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The scientist-practitioner model has traditionally been advocated 
for amongst several clinical psychology training programmes, 
promoting the idea that CPs should be equally as competent as 
researchers as they are clinical practitioners. EBP having come to 
underlie decisions about provision and funding of healthcare in the 
NHS has meant that a clinical psychologist who aligns themselves 
with the values of EBP is likely to be more comfortable operating 
in our current system. CPs who position themselves differently 
however, for example as critical practitioners who draw on 
research evidence from a more pluralistic and pragmatic manner, 
aware of the limitations of positivist methods, are likely to 
experience conflicts between what they feel is important and what 
the system, advocating for EBP, values. 
Our healthcare system can ill afford the consequences of MD, and 
burnout. The psychological impact of stress at work is significant; a poll 
of primary care workers found that 43% of this staff force had considered 
leaving their post, or already had; 21% reported having developed a MH 
problem; and 8% expressed suicidality (Mind, 2016). A ‘staffing crisis’ in 
the NHS is often written about (Brown, 2019; Hazlegreaves, 2019; Kaidi 
& Atun, 2017; Mundasad, 2017) with authors warning that the future of 
the NHS is in jeopardy. Numerous explanations for staff shortages have 
been put forth, including the argument that the NHS has been staffed 
according to what it can afford rather than what the population it serves 
needs (Mundasad, 2017). More people leaving the NHS than joining 
impacts everyone at every level – economic, therapeutic, and 
occupational; it creates an inconsistent care-experience for patients and 
a chaotic workplace for clinicians, which only adds to the probability of 
people leaving (Hazlegreaves, 2019). The implementation of the NHS 
Long Term Plan (LTP) (NHS England, 2019) is expected to be hindered 
by the on-going deficits in the workforce (Buchan et al., 2019), despite it 
being framed as an opportunity to address workforce issues. 
Clinical psychology is far from immune to retention challenges. A 
commentary on the LTP by the Division of Clinical Psychology expresses 
disappointment at a lack of attention to the psychological professions and 
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a wish for acknowledgment of how many staff are experiencing the NHS 
as a difficult place to work, considering the retention issues (Lavender, 
2019). Attempts to address the struggle to retain junior doctors have 
included raising the medical school enrolment cap and increasing locum 
posts (Kaidi & Atun, 2017); interestingly, clinical psychology appears to 
be employing similar strategies, increasing the number of training 
placements and advertising more vacancies as ‘bank’ posts. These 
(expensive) solutions are attempts to recruit, not retain; they do not 
address why clinicians, across all professions, are ‘dropping out’ of the 
NHS. Calls for action on the retention challenge, at the organisational 
level, have been sounded (Bell & Breslin, 2008; Varcoe et al., 2012).  
1.5.3. Clinical Decision-Making  
The complexities of decision-making as a human and as a HCP 
apply to CPs too. Clinical work for a CP includes decision-making 
regarding assessment, formulation, and treatment and therefore 
the issue of decision-making is at the forefront of a psychologist’s 
competence (Tracey et al., 2014). Practitioner psychologists are 
registered with and regulated by the Health and Care Professions 
Council (HCPC); their Standards of Proficiency (2015) include 
items addressing the making of ‘effective’ clinical decisions and 
are intended to be complimented by the BPS Practice Guidelines 
(2017) which assert that through their extensive ‘theory to 
practice’ training, psychologists can draw on a variety of sources 
of information and experience to make a clinical decision. They go 
on to state that what separates a psychologist from other 
therapeutic practitioners is their “ability to access, review, critically 
evaluate, analyse and synthesise data from a psychological 
perspective” when engaging in decision-making (BPS, 2017, 
p.10).  
We may therefore come to understand that continuous decision-
making, seeking to resolve repeated dilemmas, is inherent to the 
psychologist’s role (Scaturo & McPeak, 1998). This is undoubtedly 
an intricate process that calls for the integration of experience, 
(evidence-based) knowledge, and the unique qualities of the client 
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and the practitioner (Barkan, 2018); the self-evaluation of a 
practitioner’s work is therefore strongly advocated for in the 
Practice Guidelines. Several texts have thus been published as 
clinical decision-making guides, to support ‘best practice’, and 
claim to speak to achievable, accurate and concrete clinical 
decision-making (Magnavita, 2016). One could argue, however, 
that the above does not clearly distinguish CPs from other 
healthcare workers and therefore the experience of decision-
making and its consequences is likely to be similar for CPs as with 
others. 
1.5.4. BPS Code of Ethics and Conduct 
Fantus et al. (2017) note that MD may operate differently across 
healthcare professions due to differences in each discipline’s code 
of ethics and their distinct responsibilities. The ethical 
considerations governing therapeutic interventions should 
underpin decision-making in clinical practice, and the BPS Code 
of Ethics and Conduct (2018) encourages psychologists to ensure 
they have an awareness of their limitations as a professional. 
However, membership with the BPS is voluntary for psychologists 
and so the extent to which an individual psychologist is signed up 
to this code likely varies.  
 
1.6. Systematic Reviews of Moral Distress 
 
Systematic reviews of the literature on moral distress have highlighted 
that most studies on the experience have been conducted with general 
nurses; a bibliometric analysis by Lamiani et al. (2017) placed the 
prevalence at 71%. These studies (for example, work by Austin, 2007; 
Corley, 2002; Hamric, 2000; Tiedje, 2000) have demonstrated a 
significant prevalence of MD in nursing, particularly within settings such 
as end-of-life care and the decision-making processes therein. Most 
research on MD has been conducted within acute physical healthcare 
21 
 
settings, finding that MD is also experienced here by physicians, 
pharmacists, and occupational therapists (Førde & Aasland, 2008; 
Schwenzer & Wang, 2006; Sporrong et al., 2006). 
Sanderson et al.'s (2019) systematic review of the MD literature found it 
to most often be framed as an individual experience although power and 
hierarchies in the workplace are referenced. They identified that the 
numerous definitions of MD that have developed over time have limited 
the usefulness of studying MD, but go on to suggest a redefinition of their 
own: “ethical unease or disquiet resulting from a situation where a 
clinician believes they have contributed to avoidable patient or 
community harm through their involvement in an action, inaction or 
decision that conflicts with their own values” (Sanderson et al., 2019, p. 
195). 
What we know, broadly speaking, about MD is that it arose as a 
phenomenon in the context of nursing, more specifically end-of-life 
nursing, and speaks to the experience of being unable to act in 
accordance with one’s moral judgement (Rodney, 2017). It has been 
distinguished from other forms of emotional distress through an 
identification of its threat to HCPs moral agency and integrity (Hamric, 
2012), the consequences of which including desensitisation and attrition. 
Causes of MD have varied but generally include challenges in decision-
making, excessive workload, and conflict with colleagues; all of which 
have been barriers to providing the care nurses viewed as best for their 
patients. What is more unknown is how people manage this experience. 
The presence and prevalence of MD in other contexts, such as MH 
settings and professions, is also less explored.  
 
1.7. Scoping Review of Moral Distress 
 
A scoping review of the current literature on moral distress (within 
healthcare settings) was performed. A scoping review should explore the 
extent and quality of existing research on a particular issue, as well as its 
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fundamental concepts and identify any gaps in the literature. (Arksey & 
O’Malley, 2005; Peters et al., 2015).  
1.7.1. Literature Search Strategy 
Using the keywords, published, peer-reviewed work was searched 
for across electronic databases including EBSCO (PsycInfo, 
PsychARTICLES, CINAHC); Academic Search Complete; and 
Google Scholar. The terms ‘moral distress’, ‘psychology’, 
‘burnout’, ‘ethical dilemmas’, and ‘decision-making’ were used 
individually and in combination with one another. Following 
abstract readings, articles considered relevant were obtained in 
their full text and incorporated into the review. These tended to 
speak to the emotional component of clinician’s experiences or 
considered the constructs and contexts that impacted upon these 
experiences. Citation searches were also carried out and the 
reference lists of key papers were hand-searched. The search 
took place between July 2020 and February 2021. This process is 
outlined in Appendix A.  
A total of 5921 articles were identified through the search, 1156 
were screened, 97 duplicates were removed, and 80 full texts 
accessed; 14 articles remained and are spoken to in the scoping 
review below. Reasons for exclusion included a sole focus on 
paediatric settings; exploration of MD outside of a healthcare 
context; being written in a language other than English; and full 
texts not being available. Theses and dissertations, unpublished, 
were also excluded. The 80 full texts were downloaded and 
organised using the reference management software Zotero. Due 
to the scarcity of literature examining the moral experience of CPs 
in the UK, papers speaking to this outside of the UK were 
included. This process is illustrated in a chart based on Peters et 
al., (2015) in Appendix B.  
1.7.2. Nursing 
As referred to above, the concept of MD has its origins in nursing 
and subsequently most of the literature on MD has been carried 
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out with nurses. Nursing studies identified through the scoping 
review follow.  
de Veer et al. (2013) were concerned with the determinants of MD 
in everyday nursing practice and carried out a cross sectional 
correlational questionnaire survey in The Netherlands. Their 
participants were general nurses working in acute care hospitals, 
nursing homes, and elderly home care; n=365. The nurses 
completed an initial questionnaire centred around job 
characteristics and satisfaction, followed by a MD questionnaire 
(of their own design) three months later. Their results included ten 
situations with the highest intensity of MD scores, the most 
morally distressing for these nurses being times when there is a 
discrepancy between what a patient wants and what their family 
wants (M=2.54; SD=0.94). Disagreeing with a doctor (regarding 
intervention, diagnosis, or discharge), believing it is not in the 
client’s best interest, and witnessing improper behaviour in a 
colleague followed closely behind. Each of these three situations 
appeared to reflect the nurses’ sense of responsibility to their 
patients being compromised. MD was also higher particularly for 
nurses who recognised a lack of time for providing their patients 
with care. A Pearson product moment correlation coefficient 
identified that nurses who were less satisfied in their job (r= -.34, p 
<.000) were experiencing higher MD levels. Individual 
characteristics (such as age and years of experience) held no 
significant relationship with these nurses’ experiences of MD. 
Leadership style was identified as an additional situational trigger 
of MD and the authors call for organisational level interventions for 
reducing MD levels.   
An American survey into the predictors of moral distress in nurses 
was carried out by Rathert et al. (2016) who sought to build upon 
previous descriptive research by testing a comprehensive model, 
underpinned by Social Learning Theory (Bandura, 1977), 
examining the work environment and intrapersonal variables that 
may influence MD. Within an acute hospital they surveyed the 
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nursing staff and reported a response rate of 45% (n=290). More 
than half of their respondents said they had ethical difficulties on a 
monthly to daily basis. The impact of five independent variables 
on MD and moral voice were investigated using structural 
equation modelling. These were: the frequency of ethical 
dilemmas and conflicts; moral efficacy; ethics communication; 
ethical environment; and organisational ethics support.  
Their findings demonstrated that the frequency of ethics concerns 
and organisational ethics support have significant independent 
effects on MD. Moral voice entirely moderated the relationship 
between moral efficacy and MD, and somewhat mediated the 
relationship between organisational ethics support and distress, 
according to a bootstrapping analysis. Their results also 
suggested that organisational ethics support is possibly one 
important factor affecting both ethics voice (indirectly) and MD 
(directly), and following a supplemental analysis found that 
organisational ethics support moderated the moral efficacy-moral 
voice-moral distress relationship in that when organisational 
support was low, moral efficacy was negatively related to MD via 
moral voice. Rathert et al. (2016) concluded that whilst the 
elimination of ethical dilemmas is likely impossible, healthcare 
organisations may find that by improving their nurses’ moral 
efficacy they will support moral voice and thereby reduce MD. 
Having ethics resources available was not enough, the nurses 
needed to be supported in making use of them.  
The high rates of MD in the nursing experience have been 
explained through their hands-on obligations which include often 
performing lifesaving or life-ending interventions, actively provided 
or withheld (Fantus et al., 2017). Further work in The Netherlands 
by Lokker et al. (2018) explored more qualitatively the MD 
experiences of nurses, specifically those working with palliative 
sedation. The Netherlands had eight years earlier introduced 
national guidelines for palliative sedation. The researchers 
interviewed 36 nurses from primary care, hospital, and nursing 
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home settings and used a constant comparative analytic method. 
An overarching theme of ‘pressure’ emerged. The MD experience 
of these nurses was related to feeling constrained and unable to 
act in their patient’s best interest, from their view. This regularly 
included not being able to offer sedation to patients they believed 
required it because a physician disagreed, and as a nurse they 
were with the patient and their family, observing their pain, far 
more closely than the physicians. Conversely, the nurses 
described a pressure to act too soon, initiate sedation for the 
family rather than the patient. Powerlessness appeared central to 
their experiences of distress; the nurses felt they could assess 
their patient’s needs but did not have the authority to ensure they 
were met. Lokker et al. (2018) suggest some of this MD could be 
alleviated through a focus on improving communication between 
nurses and physicians and ensuring that the guidelines for the 
decision-making process around palliative sedation were 
ingrained to a greater degree.  
Forozeiya et al. (2019) noted that the growing literature base 
around MD in nurses had not given much credence to how the 
nurses were coping with this distress. They interviewed seven 
nurses working in intensive care (ICU) in Canada, the majority of 
whom had limited ICU experience. An interpretative descriptive 
approach was taken, and a thematic analysis conducted. A 
common experience for these nurses was engagement in 
practices which did not appear overall helpful to their patients and 
one of the four themes described was ‘going against what I think 
is best’; this incorporated being in a position in which they had to 
do what their physicians or patients wanted and believed was best 
rather than what they themselves did. This conflict led to negative 
emotional experiences for the nurses, and they spoke of feeling 
angry, awful, and traumatised. The consequences extended to a 
withdrawal from their own family and friends, and not wanting to 
go into work – they debated reducing their working hours or 
leaving their ICU posts. These nurses also viewed MD as being 
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inherent to their job, the denial of patient autonomy being a 
reoccurring concern and physicians often perceived as deceiving 
families, something the nurses had to witness with little power to 
intervene. The authors identified a dynamic process wherein these 
nurses would both turn toward and turn away from their MD, 
needing to avoid and distance themselves, at times by calling in 
sick, or seeking out connection with (ICU specific) colleagues who 
could relate and affirm their experience.  The researchers noted a 
risk of moral disengagement for nurses who had not found ways 
of coping but stressed this is an organisational issue, not to be 
individualised, time and space to access support and reflection as 
a prerequisite.   
1.7.3.  Moral Distress Scales 
Commonly found in the MD literature is the Moral Distress Scale-
Revised (MDS-R), a 21-item scale devised by Hamric et al. (2012) 
to measure levels of MD. Six versions exist, catering to adult and 
paediatric clinicians; nurses; physicians; and other HCPs. The 21 
items are scored via a Likert scale (0-4), across two dimensions: 
frequency, and the intensity of the disturbance. Total scores range 
from 0-336. The MDS-R concludes by enquiring about intent to 
leave a position and has three possible responses: “no, I’ve never 
considered quitting or left a position”; “yes, I considered quitting 
but did not leave”; and “yes, I left a position”. Hamric et al.’s 
(2012) original reliabilities for the MDS-R produced Cronbach of 
0.89 for nurses and 0.67 for physicians; use by Allen et al. (2013) 
later reported Cronbach reliabilities ranging from 0.88 to 0.95. 
Epstein et al. (2019) revised the MDS-R further following an 
evaluation of the data produced by 22 studies and a review of 14 
other publications. They produced a 27-item scale now named the 
Measure of Moral Distress for Healthcare Professionals (MMD-
HP) and describe it as appropriate for use in all acute settings. It is 




1.7.4. Multidisciplinary Studies 
As referenced above, much of the research into MD has taken 
place within the field of nursing. Studies exploring the concept with 
other healthcare professions have emerged in more recent years. 
One institution-wide survey conducted in the U.S.A. by Whitehead 
et al. (2015) collected completed MDS-Rs from 592 clinicians 
working at a tertiary medical hospital. This was the largest survey 
of MD amongst multiple disciplines yet. They found MD to be 
present in all their professional groups (nurses; physicians; social 
workers; pharmacists; therapists; chaplains), with significantly 
higher levels found in those who had direct patient care. Their 
Cronbach reliability was stated to be 0.90 for nurses, 0.88 for 
physicians, and 0.90 for other providers. The highest-ranked 
sources of MD here were witnessing lesser quality patient care 
due to poor communication or a lack of continuity. Echoing some 
of the previous nursing studies, clinicians working in adult and ICU 
settings reported higher levels of MD than those in paediatric or 
non-ICU settings. Higher levels of MD were also reported by 
clinicians with end-of-life care training than those without, and a 
similar correlation was found for clinicians who had departed their 
roles or were considering doing so compared to those who had 
never thought about leaving their positions. Participants who had 
never considered quitting had the lowest average MDS-R scores. 
Whitehead et al. (2015) concluded that whilst differences in 
experiences and perspectives may exist, MD was a common 
experience for clinicians, regardless of their profession. It is of 
note however that 67% of survey respondents were nurses. This 
variability in causes of MD between professions has been noted 
by a number of studies. Hamric and Blackhall (2007) for example, 
note that whilst nurses found it morally distressing to allow 
students to practice painful procedures in order to attain their 
competency, physicians did not. MD may present differently 
across the disciplines perhaps due to differing responsibilities and 
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differences in the code of ethics for each profession (Fantus et al., 
2017). 
1.7.5.  Moral Distress and Experience 
Whitehead et al. (2015)’s above study found no significant 
relationship between scores on the MDS-R and length of time in a 
profession or current post. A Canadian study by Dodek et al. 
(2016) conversely found just that. This was an ICU specific survey 
however, and there is some agreement that the MDS, revised and 
original, is more sensitive to the ICU context as this is where it 
originated. Dodek et al. (2016) distributed the MDS-R to 13 ICUs 
in British Columbia and conducted a multivariate, hierarchical 
regression to examine the relationship between MD scores, 
demographic characteristics (age, gender, years of experience), 
and intention to leave. They received a more equal response rate 
across nurses, physicians, and other HCPs (social workers; 
pharmacists; therapists); however, as the largest of the 
professional groups nurses were once again the most represented 
profession. Physicians, considered to have the highest authority 
on decision-making, reported lower levels of MD than the other 
professions and therefore control appears an important 
moderator. The highest ranked items associated with MD were 
related to budgeting constraints and end-of-life dilemmas. The 
multivariate analyses highlighted age as being inversely 
associated with MD, but only amongst the non-nurses and non-
physicians, whilst years of experience was directly associated with 
MD but only for nurses. For all except the physicians, MD scores 
were found to directly relate to tendency to leave an ICU job. This 
study sought to understand which characteristics of health 
professionals are independently associated with MD, and looked 
less to the ethical climate of the systems they are operating in.  
Physicians are often implicated in the MD experience of other 
clinicians. Work by Lomis et al. (2009) explored the MD of medical 
students in the U.S. through a descriptive review of the students’ 
case reflections. Recurrent themes were identified following an 
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analysis of 192 case reports which were categorised as exhibiting 
higher or lower levels of MD based on tone and content. The 
researchers report that 67% of the cases were identified as highly 
distressed and that the most common problem within these 
submissions centred around communication problems, with 
patients and other HCPs. The hierarchical organisation of 
healthcare was implicated here, preventing trainees from speaking 
up. Students who took action (spoke up) experienced lower levels 
of distress. Following communication, themes arose around 
problems with unprofessional behaviour (of senior physicians); 
systems of care (access and continuity inside and outside the 
institution); severe illness (death, ICU, prognostic uncertainty); 
medical error (near misses and complications); role models 
(positive and negative); and student action (regret of inaction). As 
students, these participants appeared to take up a liaison position 
between patients and physicians, questioning what they observed 
but unsure how to respond to concerns. The authors conclude that 
MD-generating situations are identifiable and to support the 
trainees’ development this distress should be more readily 
addressed. Forums for discussion were notably absent but valued 
by participants, and a culture change seemed necessitated for 
improved communication.  
In Australia, Crane et al. (2013) interviewed 14 medical doctors 
(most of whom were specialists) regarding their experiences of 
MD, doing so due to the decision-making autonomy afforded to 
doctors in the healthcare system. Their interviews incorporated 
the items from the MDS. Four themes were identified, the first 
being that MD arose for these doctors because of institutional 
constraints impacting their autonomous experience of decision-
making. However, over half of these doctors were not morally 
distressed by such events, assigning the limitations of care to the 
system and not themselves. A mixed experience arose with Crane 
et al.’s participants, some of whom reported significant feelings of 
guilt and shame around their decision-making, such as instances 
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where a patient’s suffering was prolonged due to attempts to keep 
them alive. Others though did not assign moral significance to 
such errors in judgement. The final theme concerned a delayed 
onset of MD, the distress arising in retrospect, an example being 
of having performed an abortion which was felt to violate a moral 
framework later when the doctor had their own children. Notably, 
however, only two participants produced this theme and so the 
authors argument for adjusting the definition of MD to exclude a 
necessity for a moral conflict to be identified in advance of 
experiencing the distress is not entirely convincing from these 
results only.  
1.7.6. Moral Distress and the Crescendo Effect 
The Dodek et al. (2016) survey described its finding on MD being 
directly associated with years of experience (in nursing) as 
providing evidence for the ‘crescendo effect’ (Epstein & Hamric, 
2009). The suggestion is that MD builds over time and unresolved 
MD endures even once the moral conflict has dissipated, leaving a 
moral ‘residue’ that means recurrent experiences of MD can 
intensify and escalate, and may have a lasting impact on 
professional practice (Epstein & Delgado, 2010). Subsequent 
experiences accumulate and over time the effect can desensitize 
workers to the moral aspects of a situation, leading to 
disengagement (Bandura, 2012). “Repeated experiences of moral 
distress indicate deeper, systemic problems of poor 
communication, inadequate collaboration, and perceived 
powerlessness resulting from hierarchical structures” (Epstein and 
Hamric, 2009, p. 338); the hierarchical structures are a significant 
factor in this complex process, ones that are certainly pertinent to 
UK healthcare provision.  
1.7.7. Moral Distress and Mental Health  
When referring to ‘therapists’ in their category of ‘other HCPs’, the 
studies above are speaking of physio therapists; respiratory 
therapists; occupational therapists etc. Psychologists are not 
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traditionally included in these studies which are being conducted 
in North American physical health settings, where psychologists 
do not appear to be integrated into medical teams. MH services 
and psychological provision may hold specific challenges, such as 
the tension between individualised aetiology and the impact of 
social context and inequalities.  
The reoccurring finding surrounding considerably higher levels of 
MD in nurses than physicians is perhaps accounted for by nurses’ 
greater familiarity with patients and the power hierarchy found in 
most healthcare organisations, where the care is directed by 
physicians and the fundamental characteristic of MD that is 
powerlessness can arise (Musto et al., 2015). Psychologists 
typically become similarly familiar with their patients, developing a 
detailed understanding of a patient’s past and present 
circumstances. Psychologists can be in more powerful positions 
than nurses however, greater weight afforded to them due to their 
professional title, and therefore an interesting comparison can 
arise, psychologists taking up space somewhere between nurses 
and physicians. Through the scoping review a small number of 
papers were identified investigating MD within MH settings. 
Notably, one study by Austin and colleagues (2003; 2005; 2008) 
had produced numerous publications; this was a Canadian 
hermeneutic phenomenological study using individual interviews 
to explore the lived experience of MD with psychiatrists, 
psychiatric nurses, social workers, and psychologists. Each 
discipline of 6-9 participants engaged in a dialogue with a 
researcher from the same discipline. A publication of the social 
work findings could not be located, but three studies by the 
researchers pertaining to the other three professions are spoken 
to below.  
First, Austin et al. (2003) described psychiatric nurses 
experiences of MD, who cited a lack of resource (staffing; time) 
producing dispiritedness, and a lack of respect and 
acknowledgment for staff and patients alike which was 
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significantly diminishing their sense of being able to provide good 
care. The nursing staff named anger, frustration, and sadness in 
response to being unable to meet the needs of their patients due 
to what was lacking. The nurses also spoke to a dehumanisation 
of patients and staff, no one being known in their entirety but 
rather becoming a diagnosis (patients) or part of a machine 
(nurses). Noticing this and becoming distressed by it was 
deflected by the institution when it was named – ‘do your best’ not 
feeling a sufficient response. These nurses had sworn to devote 
themselves to caring, but this responsibility had become an 
individual liability, they had not been afforded the necessary 
power and control to safely attend to their responsibilities, and the 
researchers emphasised the need for health institutions, and 
society, to make the necessary resources available to nurses so 
they may fulfil their commitment to competent and ethical practice.  
Secondly, Austin et al. (2005) described the MD as experienced 
by psychologists in their study. The paper is interestingly titled ‘To 
Stay or To Go, To Speak or Stay Silent, To Act or Not To Act’. 
These psychologists spoke to events during which their integrity 
felt compromised and identified factors such as team conflict, 
interdisciplinary disputes, and institutional demands as 
contributing to this. Congruent to Godkin’s (2000, cited in Austin et 
al., 2005) suggestion that humans often notice an ethical issue 
has arisen based on pain in the ‘gut’, the psychologists here 
described having horrible, intolerable feelings including anger, 
shame, grief, embarrassment and sadness. Mechanisms by which 
to manage this MD, deployed by the psychologists, included 
taking a stand or acting secretively (afraid of repercussions); 
engrossing themselves in the therapeutic work; aligning with 
colleagues for support; remaining silent (to avoid alienation); or 
leaving their post. The psychologists spoke of a reoccurring self-
questioning of their ability to make change, of noticing a feeling of 
‘hitting a brick wall’ and reaching a point at which perseverance 
seems futile. Leaving though, was just as hard as staying.  
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Finally, Austin et al. (2008) explored psychiatrists’ experience of 
MD, who reported wrestling to ‘do the right thing’ for their patients 
in the context of a societal system which lays demands, perceived 
as unrealistic, upon the psychiatrists’ expertise. A difficulty with 
certainty arose here, an expectation that the psychiatrists can and 
should make sure decisions about coercive treatment and 
assessments of danger. This expectation was felt to be unrealistic 
and removed from the complexity of an uncertain reality. However, 
psychiatrists have been identified “as the most powerful non-
government decision-maker” (Austin et al., 2008, p. 91) with the 
ability to take a person’s freedom and liberty away (Robitscher, 
1980; cited in Austin et al., 2008). MD arose for these psychiatrists 
in the context of this balancing act, the responsibility society 
places upon them to care for vulnerable people with reduced 
autonomy, whilst shouldering accountability around public 
protection. These roles were often in conflict, seemingly more so 
as the psychiatrists found themselves increasingly facing a 
pressure to fit social ills into the medical model through which 
much of Western society makes sense of distress (Austin et al., 
2008).  
One MD study identified through the scoping review was carried 
out closer to home, with Irish psychiatric nurses. Deady and 
McCarthy (2010) interviewed eight psychiatric nurses working 
within acute care settings and carried out a thematic analysis in 
line with Pope et al.'s (2000) guidance. They describe their 
findings as confirming the presence of MD and the situations 
which gave rise to MD for these psychiatric nurses were 
segmented into three categories: “professional and legal conflict; 
professional autonomy and scope of practice; and standards of 
care and client autonomy” (Deady & McCarthy, 2010, p. 5). 
Sharing an opposing view, challenging a clinical decision, was 
difficult for these participants who did not feel valued or that any 
change would come from it, and the client’s needs were 
deprioritised. Similarly, their position as nurses who spent 
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extended periods of time with their clients was not valued enough 
to influence clinical decision-making. Thirdly, the witnessing of 
substandard (by their measure) care, which they had little power 
to influence across all levels of their MH system, was distressing. 
Participants felt the impact of this upon both their professional and 
personal lives and described feeling frustration, anger, guilt, and 
depression which followed them home and endured over 
extended periods. Their strategies for coping included attempts to 
adapt to the culture, deny there is a problem, establish a separate 
moral code for work, and/or leave their job. As with other studies, 
participants here reported their organisations being inadequately 
aware of or supportive of the moral challenges in clinical practice.  
Musto et al. (2021) explored how multidisciplinary healthcare 
providers in Canadian acute MH settings navigate ethical 
dilemmas and mitigate MD. They used Grounded Theory to 
analyse documents, observations, and interview data with 
participants working across inpatient and emergency departments. 
All participants were regulated health professionals, predominately 
psychiatric nurses (N=14), but also medics (N=2), social workers 
(N=3), occupational therapists (N=2), and registered nurses (N=6). 
They found that a constant source of MD for these participants 
was what they named ‘systemic inhumanity’, “a fundamental 
inability in the healthcare system to respond consistently with 
respect, dignity, and compassion towards people struggling with 
MH issues” (Musto et al., 2021, p. 2461). Barriers to humane 
practice had been written into the system’s policies. To manage 
this, their participants ‘risked vulnerability’, striving to practice 
ethically whilst balancing organisational processes and 
professional obligation. This risk included ‘pushing back’ (acting 
strategically, holding onto professional identity) and ‘working 
through team relationships’ (identifying boundaries, strategising). 
Musto et al.’s work was one of the few papers identified which 
considered the impact of socio-political factors like austerity 
measures on ethical practice, and how this undermined 
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participants’ moral enactment. The decision making of their HCPs 
was also understood as being challenged by how austerity had 
shaped their clinical environments. Moral agency and the role of 
action was identified as a key influence of MD, with a dynamic and 
relational component; participants who were helped by others in 
their organisation to enact moral agency avoided becoming ‘stuck’ 
in MD. The researchers concluded that such an embodied and 
dynamic process called for interventions across the micro, meso 
and macro levels with a shared responsibility for change. 
Institutions, organisations, individuals, and regulatory bodies must 
work collaboratively, they say, to implement practices which allow 
values to be enacted and foster moral agency to humanise care.  
Baker Collins and Cranmer-Byng (2018) too focused upon the 
structural constraints, such as restrictive policies, which contribute 
to MD. Theirs was a study based in Ontario, Canada in which 
interviews were conducted with 15 case managers (social 
workers) whose environment they described as having undergone 
a neo-liberal restructuring, which impacted their ability to practice 
in accordance with the social justice values integral to the 
profession. MD was not the original focus of these interviews but 
was elicited as the participants spoke of the systemic conflicts 
they were facing as they attempted to navigate a restrictive 
programme alongside the complex needs of their clients. Interview 
data was analysed thematically, and two overarching themes were 
presented: contributory systemic and contextual factors leading to 
MD, and the participants attempts to cope, including through 
resistance. This first theme referred to a lack of time to 
meaningfully be with their clients due to substantial caseloads and 
burdensome data reporting requirements. They expressed the 
erosion of a therapeutic relationship related to this, and the impact 
this had on their experience of ethical decision-making. Their 
resistance spanned smaller, typically disguised, acts of rebellion 
to more openly resistant micro-acts. They tried to ‘lessen the 
damage’ by being strategic around the timing of their decision-
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enforcement, and proactively sought out more meaningful 
engagement with their clients in hope of waylaying the system’s 
rigid distancing of client and professional.  
1.7.8. Neglected Areas 
A small number of studies have examined MD within MH care, 
with recent additions from psychiatric settings (Deady & McCarthy, 
2010; Lützén et al., 2010). Only one publication identified during 
the scoping review dealt singularly with the MD experiences of 
psychologists (Austin et al., 2005) and these were psychologists 
operating in a Canadian MH system. No investigations into MD 
with CPs in the UK were found. CPs in the UK’s NHS are 
operating within settings where the resources are low, and the 
demand is high. They too are likely to regularly face ethical 
dilemmas and have fluctuating decision-making autonomy which 
may conflict with their sense of duty to care and compromise 
adherence to the code of ethics they subscribe to (not necessarily 
the BPS’).  
In a review of the three decades worth of research on moral 
distress, Rodney (2017) acknowledges some of the criticisms of 
the concept itself and suggests ways for it to be moved forward. 
She recommends there be increased investigation of MD in more 
diverse practice areas, beyond acute contexts like critical care to 
focus more on MH, community, and long-term care. Rodney also 
encourages researchers to consider the reciprocity between 
organisations and individuals, examining MD through a relational 
ethical lens. Psychologists are perhaps a group well suited to 
considering the interconnectedness between people and 
structures. MD has been identified as more prevalent in clinicians 
who work with adults (Whitehead et al., 2015) and so CPs 






1.8. Relevance and Rationale 
 
The ideological power and social and cultural capital held by clinical 
psychologists necessitates an investigation into the presence of moral 
distress within the profession. The leadership path CPs are encouraged 
to follow, to a different degree than other MH HCPs in the NHS, also 
provides reason to research MD specifically with CPs, an awareness of 
personal values being key to effective leadership (DCP Professional 
Standards Unit, 2010), and leaders being in a position to dictate an 
organisation’s – in this case a healthcare system’s – values and 
principles. 
To my knowledge, the concept of MD has not been explored with CPs in 
the UK. Much of the MD research has been conducted in North America, 
and a study in the NHS (a ‘socialised’ healthcare system) is warranted. 
Doing so may refine our understanding of this psychological experience 
and might additionally tell us something about the way our profession is 
currently operating – how aligned our aims are with our actions, how we 
fit into the healthcare system, and what values and beliefs exist about 
what psychology ‘should’ be doing. Additionally, conversations about 
morality within healthcare are particularly salient in this time of an 
international pandemic. Engaging with this study topic as a clinical 
psychology issue is consistent with the BPS's ethical commitments and 
the profession's broader claims to be concerned with ethical conduct 
(British Psychological Society, 2018; Butchard & Greenhill, 2015; 
Kinderman, 2007). 
 
1.9. Research Questions  
 
1. What situations or experiences can make psychologists feel their 
personal or professional values are compromised?  
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2. How do clinical psychologists experience conflicts between their 
values and institutional procedures, and how do they attempt to 
manage them? 

























2. CHAPTER TWO: METHODS 
 
 
This chapter will summarise the epistemological position taken, and the 
research methodology used during the research process. The data collection 
procedure and method of analysis will be defined and justified, with ethical 
concerns considered. 
 
2.1. Epistemological Position  
 
Through ontology we consider our beliefs about the nature of reality, and 
in taking an epistemological stance we make claims about the production 
of knowledge. A researcher’s epistemological position is the conceptual 
framework from which all research begins and is consequently key in 
understanding the way the research has been designed, carried out, and 
interpreted (Willig, 2012; 2019). 
It is therefore important to share my own positioning in this thesis as a 
critical realist (Bhaskar, 2008). The limitations of relativism and positivism 
influenced the emergence of critical realism as a philosophical position, 
limitations such as the rigidity of acknowledging only that which is 
‘proven’ through math or science. Critical realism theorises that there is a 
reality existing independently from our minds, but it is one we cannot be 
in direct contact with. There are real mechanisms (such as biology) 
producing phenomena which we can observe and know of, but we 
accept that our ability to discover the world is limited. 
In the social sciences, critical realism allows us to understand social 
affairs as having a complex composition, centred around social 
structures, their origins, and the human capacity for reflection. Language 
supports us in constructing our social reality, but these creations are 
themselves constrained by the inescapable material world (Riley et al., 
2007). Operating within clinical psychology, as a critical realist, means 
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exploring scientific and technical concepts within the conditions (cultural, 
historical) through which they emerged (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999). It is our 
theories of reality, the claims we make about it, which are socially 
constructed. The theories and methods presented within this thesis have 
been shaped by social forces and influenced by a variety of stakeholders 
and agendas.  
In this study I will be working within the tangible, substantial reality of 
healthcare provision, in which some conditions (principally physical 
health) will have material underpinnings while others (principally mental 
health) will be subject to a greater degree of social construction and 
mediation. This reality will be explored in the context of ideas 
surrounding morality, which are socially, culturally, and historically 
mediated. To understand the experiences of the CPs in this study we 
must acknowledge the physical reality of providing psychological support 
to the national population (resource limitation, institutional procedures) 
and the socio-historical production of morality, ethics, and “moral 
distress”. Similarly, the concept of distress itself is socially and 
historically mediated; manifestations of distress and people’s 
experiences of it will vary, but we do not seek to deny the lived reality of 
this distress (Pilgrim & Bentall, 1999).  
Critical realism pursues the production of a philosophy that we can live 
by (Bhaskar & Hartwig, 2016), which aligns with this study’s aim to 
support clinical practice. However, whilst this research may describe the 
reality of its participants, the methods utilised to explore their 
experiences of moral distress have been influenced by established socio-
cultural assumptions (Willig, 2012).  
 
2.2. Methodological Approach 
 
This thesis is qualitative in design as it seeks to explore, describe, and 
interpret the experiences of CPs by obtaining rich, ‘thick’ accounts. This 
research in interested in the impact and management of ethical 
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dilemmas in clinical psychology practice, if these experiences equate to 
moral distress, and hopes to complement the largely quantitative 
literature on moral distress. A review of this existing literature on moral 
distress identified significant contributions from the nursing profession 
but very few investigations of the concept within clinical psychology, 
none having been produced in the UK. The UK of course has its own 
cultural idiosyncrasies and historical context for healthcare provision and 
an understanding of whether moral distress is present in our profession, 
in our national health service context, is perhaps particularly important 
given the ‘retention problem’ (Buchan et al., 2019).  
2.2.1. Thematic Analysis  
I sought to describe and interpret the views of participants, and 
identify any patterns in the data, whilst accounting for context, 
values, and varying experiences. Thematic analysis (TA) is a 
method “for identifying, analysing and interpreting patterned 
meanings or themes”, (Braun & Clarke, 2006, p. 79) and does not 
make a priori assumptions, which supports this study’s efforts to 
explore ethical dilemmas whilst leaving space for a moral 
grounding to potentially emerge. The flexibility afforded by TA 
lends itself to an exploration of meanings shared by participants 
and coherently aligns with a critical realist epistemological 
positioning (Nowell et al., 2017). 
TA can be utilised with almost every form of qualitative data, 
including interview data (Braun & Clarke, 2006). It is important to 
note however that when analysing interview data through TA I am 
generating an outsider account rather than inhabiting a lived 
experience. When I use the term ‘experience’ in this study I am 
enquiring about what it is like for these participants to work 
through these dilemmas, and experience the emotional impact of 
them, whilst trying to navigate a decision-making process. TA 
pays attention to the language participants use and where they 
place themselves in relation to others; it is attentive to language, 
but it does not give language centrality in the manner that 
discourse analysis may (Paltridge, 2012), for example. TA allows 
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for a systematic structuring of the data and produces a reading of 
the material, that is an interpretation of the data developed by a 
researcher and their supervisor, which does not make claims to 
truth (Nowell et al., 2017). An inductive approach is undertaken 
here, the analysis not being driven by any predetermined theory or 
framework (Patton, 1990), allowing the themes to identify more 
closely with the data.  
I am conscious of the writings of Kerry Chamberlain on 
methodolatry (Chamberlain, 2000) and the tension between 
description and interpretation. Chamberlain commented on the 
dominance of thematic analyses of interview data in qualitative 
research, and the tendency for portions of transcripts to be shared 
as though they speak for themselves. I therefore intend to go 
beyond description to interpretation and work in ‘discovery mode’ 
(Becker, 1993) to interpret what is happening in the interviews in a 
more meaningful manner.  
Additionally, I note the criticisms of TA by some researchers who 
declare it ‘unsophisticated’, in the shadow of Discourse Analysis 
or Interpretive Phenomenological Analysis, for example. This may 
however speak to the risks of descriptive applications of TA 
referred to above, rather than being a critique of TA’s internal 
validity. To monitor my own application and ensure reflexivity 
during the analysis process Braun and Clarke’s (2006) checklist 




Participants in this study were practicing CPs, working within the NHS 
and providing psychological support to adults. Research by Guest et al. 
(2006) found that the point by which saturation is achieved within 
interview data is at the 12th participant and this served as a guide for my 
sample size aim of 8-15 participants; however, I do acknowledge that 
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their work was completed in a different context, that of Grounded Theory, 
and do not intend to claim that reliability can be achieved through a 
number alone. Ultimately, 14 participants provided data for this study.  
2.3.1. Inclusion Criteria 
The inclusion criteria for this study were as follows: 
- Qualified CPs 
- CPs who are practicing in the UK, in the NHS 
- CPs who are providing psychological support to adults  
 
All participants were screened on first contact to ensure the above 
criteria were met. Several people were excluded during screening 
due to them no longer working in the NHS, or only working with 
children, for example. These criteria were in place to ensure the 
data not be confused by a mix of participants working with clients 
who have reduced capacity during decision-making processes 
(e.g. children) or participants who face different constraints due to 
not working in the dominant healthcare institution in the UK (the 
NHS).  
2.3.2. Sampling 
Purposive sampling was employed, participants being selected 
according to the above criteria, relevant to the research questions 
(i.e. that participants be practicing CPs). Snowball sampling 
(Robson, 2002) was also in place, with participants passing on the 
details of the study to others within their personal and professional 
networks who may have been interested.  
2.3.3. Recruitment  
Participants were recruited primarily through advertising on social 
networking platforms, namely Twitter and Facebook, where there 
is a closed group for UK CPs which at the time of writing has 
approximately 6,000 members. The poster shared for advertising 
purposes can be seen in Appendix C. Recruitment also occurred 
through informal networks, friends and acquaintances sharing the 
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poster advertising the study with those they thought may meet the 
criteria. Once screened, each participant was emailed a copy of 
the Participant Information Sheet and encouraged to ask me any 
questions via email. If participation was agreed, a date and time to 
hold the interview was organised. All communication with 
participants, throughout the research process, has been 
electronic.  
2.3.4. Sample Characteristics 
Extensive demographic information for participants in this study 
was not gathered as this was not directly relevant to the research 
questions. What is known is the gender, age range, nationality, 
years of experience, geographical location and work setting of 
each participant. Of the 14 CPs who participated in an interview 
five (36%) were men and nine (64%) were women. All but one 
participant was aged between 30 and 50, the former being in their 
early 60s. All but one participant was British, the former being 
American. Eleven participants were White; three described 
themselves as People of Colour. The participants had 131 years 
of qualified clinical psychology practice between them. Their years 
of experience had a mean of nine, mode and median of six, and a 
range of 29. Two participants worked in Wales, where there are of 
course some differences in the commissioning structures of 
mental healthcare compared to England, where the other 12 
resided. Of these 12, a majority worked in the south of the 
country. Work settings included CMHTs (4); inpatient units (3); 
complex physical health (3); early intervention (2); and secondary 
care therapy services (2).  
 
2.4. Data Collection 
 
To address the research questions, descriptions of experiences were 
required and so methods such as focus groups or individual interviews 
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were viable. Discussions about ethical clinical practice are complex and 
potentially sensitive, exploring the morality of one’s profession may 
perhaps rather be done with some anonymity. Focus groups additionally 
posed logistical issues (finding suitable dates and times for all, for 
example) and there were concerns around power relations (junior 
psychologists perhaps needing to safeguard their reputations in front of 
seniors). Therefore, the most appropriate method of collecting data for 
this study appeared to be individual interviews, which would be semi-
structured to allow for elaboration and clarification.  
Data was collected between August and October 2020. Due to COVID-
19 restrictions interviews were conducted over videocall via Microsoft 
Teams. Each interview was audio-recorded on an encrypted digital audio 
recording device, in addition to the internal recording within Microsoft 
Teams.  
2.4.1. Interview Procedure  
Conducting the interviews online via videocall required some 
additional considerations around privacy and confidentiality, 
ensuring that participants felt comfortable to speak from where 
they were, and knowing that from where I was too that they would 
not be overheard; to this end, I wore earphones during each 
interview and checked if interruptions were expected. Consent 
forms were emailed to each participant at least 24 hours prior to 
their interview date and time, returned via email also, and an 
opportunity to discuss this was in place at the start of each 
interview. Each participant was given the opportunity to ask any 
questions before the interview commenced, and permission to 
record was obtained before the digital audio recording device or 
Microsoft Teams was set to do so. Once the interview began, 
questions were asked one at a time and responses – including 
emotional state – were monitored. As the interviews neared an 
end, each participant was asked again if they had any questions 
and there was space for reflection after the recording was stopped 
to allow for an ‘unwatched’ debrief where the experience of the 
interview was shared. Each participant received a follow-up email 
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after their interview containing a ‘debrief sheet’ (Appendix D) with 
information on support available and a reminder of their right to 
withdraw before analysis began. A time of one hour was allocated 
for each interview; interview lengths ranged from 31 to 62 
minutes.   
2.4.2. Interview Approach  
A semi-structured interview schedule was devised and can be 
seen in Appendix E. An interview schedule being in place does 
risk restricting a participant’s freedom; however, a semi-structured 
design meant each interview was guided by the schedule but not 
rigidly dictated by it. The flexibility afforded by a semi-structured 
interview also meant meanings could be clarified, follow-ups 
proffered, and the order of the questions could vary depending on 
the direction the participant had taken. In devising the interview 
schedule a light framework was drawn upon wherein more general 
questions about the participant opened the interview, progressing 
onto broader questions on the topic at hand, before seeking 
example-based responses, participants being asked to recall a 
clinical case and a decision they had to make regarding an ethical 
dilemma, to ground the conversation in something more tangible. 
Broadly, the interview schedule covered: the professional values 
of clinical psychology; relationships between personal values and 
professional requirements; occasions participants had been 
unable to provide the support they thought would be ‘best’; the 
impact of ethical dilemmas on the experience of being a CP; and 
the relationship between power and ethical decision-making. The 
schedule was piloted prior to interviewing the first participant and 
revisions were made to address the research questions more 
closely. The interview schedule is designed to primarily ask open 
questions and avoid leading questions; occasionally closed 
questions were utilised to probe and clarify when required. 
Although I did not adopt a therapeutic approach, I was aware that 
the interview could be emotionally taxing and so did take an 




Interviews were transcribed verbatim in their entirety; audio 
recording having begun after each participant consented to the 
Microsoft Teams function and the digital audio recording device 
being turned on. Transcription was carried out manually, from the 
audio file produced by the digital audio recording device. The 
video file from Microsoft Teams was used to cross-check, if there 
was uncertainty about what was heard on the audio file. Questions 
were included in the transcript and below in some of the extracts 
as illustrations for themes, to fully represent the interaction and 
provide context. What participants say is important, but it must be 
understood as a response to what was asked. Each interview was 
transcribed within a week of it taking place, and a semantic level 
of transcription has been employed, following adapted 
conventions advocated for by Banister et al. (2011). Laughing, 
inaudible moments, and crying have been noted as well as any 
lengthy pauses, across all transcripts. This thesis did not seek to 
examine rhetorical devices nor speech patterns and so the 
transcription format required no further sophistication, such as that 
proposed by Jefferson (in Lerner, 2004). A transcription key, 
describing the notation system used can be seen in Appendix F.  
 
2.5. Ethical Considerations  
 
2.5.1. Ethical Approval 
Ethical approval for this study was granted by the School of 
Psychology Research Ethics Committee within the University of 
East London on 22nd July 2020 (Appendix G).  
2.5.2. Informed Consent 
The Participant Information Sheet (Appendix H), shared with all 
participants at the point of expression of interest, included details 
of the study title; the purpose of the research; the nature of 
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participation; the study’s voluntary nature; and emphasised their 
right to cease participation and/or withdraw their data. Information 
on how their data will be managed was also included. There was 
no compensatory incentive offered for participation in this study, 
nor any deception involved. Consent forms (Appendix I) were 
shared and signed prior to each interview commencing. 
The interview topic, ethical dilemmas and moral distress, is 
expected to be an emotive one however I sought to be transparent 
about what the interview would entail through the advertising 
poster, information sheet, and screening conversations. Collecting 
the data via individual interviews also allowed for monitoring of a 
participant’s response to the questions so that a pause or 
adaption could be made if indicated.   
During recruitment I reflected on an assumption of mine that my 
participants – CPs – would be knowledgeable of the thesis 
processes and noted a concern about my communication 
regarding procedures appearing patronising. However, I 
maintained a common protocol throughout recruitment and 
ensured there was space and time for discussion about the 
information sheet and consent form, where questions could be 
posed, and clarifications offered.  
2.5.3. Risk  
When considering the risk of participation I was wary of 
demoralising clinicians through their participation, encouraging 
them to talk about what they might rather avoid thinking about 
(potentially unethical clinical practice) in order to be able to 
continue practicing in these systems, and also wondered about 
threats to participants’ self-image through internal appraisal 
(Allmark et al., 2009). To attempt to counter this I reviewed the 
interview schedule to ensure questions were open and 
participants would have control over how they responded. 
Additionally, as a trainee I considered the potential complications 
of recruiting a CP working as a supervisor in the North Thames 
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region, the possibility of us encountering one another after the 
research is completed. All participants were aware of my trainee 
status and the location of my training programme and gave 
informed consent. The risk to myself appeared minor, perhaps 
some awkwardness due to the trainee-qualified CP dynamic, but 
considerations on how my relationship with the profession could 
have been impacted are below. 
2.5.4. Confidentiality and Anonymity 
In this study participants’ data is not being gathered anonymously; 
their names, email addresses, and faces are now known to me. 
To ensure their anonymity in this thesis, and any dissemination, 
each participant has been given a pseudonym, applied from the 
point of transcription. Participants are aware that quotes, verbatim 
extracts, from their interview may be used in the thesis and any 
potential publication. Participants’ names and contact details have 
been stored separately and securely away from the data, and all 
identifying information was permanently deleted once analysis 
began. Through each pseudonym only gender should be assumed 
by the reader when extracts are presented.  
2.5.5. Data Management  
With all interviews taking place electronically, data was recorded 
within Microsoft Teams (audio-visual) and on an encrypted digital 
audio recording device. Access to the Microsoft Teams recordings 
is automatically restricted to myself only; each video was 
downloaded immediately after the interview was completed and 
transferred to my University of East London OneDrive cloud 
storage account, along with the audio file. Once transferred, the 
audio file was deleted from the digital audio recording device. The 
transcriptions were also stored in password-protected files on a 
password-protected computer and on the password-protected 
cloud storage, OneDrive. Once the thesis has been submitted and 
examined all recordings will be securely deleted and only the 
anonymised transcripts retained; these will be destroyed up to two 
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years after submission of the thesis. The research supervisor and 
I will be the only people able to access the data. However, the 
supervisor will see the data only in its anonymised form. The 
study’s documents explained the above to all participants.  
2.5.6. Dissemination 
The findings of this study and its report will be summarised and 
shared with those participants who requested a copy be sent to 
them post examination. For those who did not request this post-
interview, I will contact them to ask if they would like a copy once 
available. I will additionally offer to discuss the summary with each 
participant. The thesis will be made available for viewing on 
University of East London’s research repository. I plan to submit 
the study for wider publication and hope that all those invested in 
the profession of clinical psychology will find it an interesting, 
usefully challenging read.  
 
2.6. Analytical Approach 
 
The analysis procedure adhered to Braun and Clarke’s (2006) six stages 
for TA, which are outlined below. 
2.6.1. Stage One: Familiarisation with the Data 
Multiple readings of the transcripts served to build familiarly with 
the data and the accounts therein.  
2.6.2. Stage Two: Generating Initial Codes 
Transcripts were then more closely examined for pertinent 
information, details which were noted in the margins. Here the 
data was segmented into meaningful units, identifiable through 
labels or names – codes. An inductive TA was employed and so 
the codes were derived from the raw data. The software 
programme ‘NVivo’ aided the organisation and systemisation of 
these codes. An example of a coded extract can be seen in 
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Appendix J and a list of the initial codes developed is available in 
Appendix K. A spider diagram for each participant was created, 
incorporating the codes from their transcript, to support 
identification of reoccurrence across the data set, an example is in 
Appendix L. 
2.6.3. Stage Three: Searching for Themes 
The next step was to begin linking the codes together and notice 
any patterns within them to generate early themes from 
‘meaningful groups’ of codes. Braun and Clarke (2006) define a 
theme as being a construct through which we capture “something 
important about the data in relation to the research question” (p. 
82) and so a semantic and conceptual reading of the data was 
undertaken. Further spider diagrams were drawn up to illustrate 
the grouping of prevalent codes and begin identifying themes.  
2.6.4. Stage Four: Reviewing Themes 
A cyclical process of reflection and revision followed. 
Superordinate and subordinate themes (subthemes) were 
distinguished, whilst I repeatedly returned to the data to ensure 
that there remained a connection between the themes, codes, and 
quotes and therefore that the analysis was grounded in the data. 
The internal homogeneity and external heterogeneity of these 
themes was assessed in collaboration with the supervisor, 
undergoing a reviewing of their ability to represent, meaningfully, 
the dataset (Patton, 1990). An example of thematic map 
refinement can be reviewed in Appendix M. 
2.6.5. Stage Five: Defining and Naming Themes 
A refinement of the themes followed, adjusting the titles of the 
themes and their framing, collapsing, and restructuring until a final 
thematic map was produced; this is presented in Chapter Three.  
2.6.6. Stage Six: Producing the Report  
To ensure coherence and rigour, pertinent data extracts are 
presented in Chapter Three illustrating each theme and sub-
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theme in an analytic narrative. A discussion then follows as to the 
implication of these interpretations.   
 
2.7. Reflexivity  
 
2.7.1. Personal Reflexivity 
Personal reflexivity speaks to the extent to which a researcher’s 
beliefs, values, and experiences shape the research (Willig, 
2019). Inductive thematic analysis requires interpretations be 
made of the data, and these interpretations are made by the 
researcher – the researcher takes on the role of interpreter, and 
therefore we must acknowledge the impossibility of separating the 
researcher from the research and examine the relationship 
between the researcher and their interpretations – the research. I 
am the researcher; I am the interpreter. I am a White British 
woman in my late 20s, from a working-class and care-experienced 
background, in my final year of a clinical psychology doctorate 
programme. I have academic requirements to attend to, whilst 
working as a Trainee CP. I therefore stand quite closely to the 
issues being explored in this research project, clinically, ethically, 
personally. This is an investigation of the moral state of a 
profession I am about to enter as an almost-peer for my 
participants. I had expectations about what I may learn from my 
participants, having worked and trained in similar clinical settings 
and having experienced ethical dilemmas in practice of my own.  
2.7.2. Epistemological Reflexivity  
Epistemological reflexivity speaks to the extent to which the 
research questions, study design, and method of analysis have 
influenced the outcomes (Willig, 2012; 2019). When analysing and 
interpreting the data in this study, my position as a critical realist 
created a lens through which I identified patterns, and themes. 
The results of this study were influenced by what I had read about 
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the topic of moral distress previously, and by the narratives 
around ‘burn out’ which we are all so saturated in when working in 
the NHS. There is perhaps also a generational reading, my 
perception as a member of the incoming graduating class of CPs 
influencing how I asked questions during data collection, and how 
























3. CHAPTER THREE: RESULTS 
 
3.1. Thematic Map 
 
Three themes and six subordinate (sub) themes were identified during 
analysis. Figure 1. presents a summary of these themes and their 
subthemes.  
 
Figure 1.: Overview of themes and subthemes derived from a thematic 
analysis of the interview data.  
 
3.2. Theme One: Being in Services 
 
Participants’ experiences of ethical dilemmas were situated within the 
context of their positions as CPs operating within a nationalised health 
service, a public body with a duty to care and a duty to safeguard. These 
duties, at times, conflicted with one another, and obligations to an 
individual client and their therapeutic needs were complicated by the 
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system’s policies, procedures, and/or practices. This produced difficult 
decision-making experiences and the CPs spoke to a push-and-pull 
resource tension, struggling with the demand, and ideas about the NHS 
being a machine.  
“It feels like there’s a lot more compromising to be made and a lot 
more difficult decisions to be made” (Lucy, 59-60).  
Waiting lists and targets are prioritised and the CPs notice the impact this 
has on patient choice and care, the therapeutic relationship not given 
due weight. This violates what the CPs believe is important but part of 
the experience of being in their services – in these systems – is a ‘letting 
go’ of ideals.  
“… ultimately my voice can only stretch so far. So, I have had to 
kind of let my own values be pushed to the back” (Bina, 59-60). 
 
3.2.1. Subtheme: Doing the Right Thing  
A subtheme arose concerning service gaps in the system and the 
inaccessibility of what does exist, how ‘wrong’ this feels, and how 
feeling an ethical obligation to ‘do the right thing’ can lead CPs to 
‘go the extra mile.’ 
Participants shared a dilemma around how inaccessible services 
are by design, that getting in the door itself is a hardship for many 
and that it requires a client to be presenting with a very specific 
level of need or distress, a little or a lot, a binary of extremes. For 
the many people who are assessed as presenting with more 
moderate levels of distress no service exists to accept them and 
they ‘fall through the gap’ unless they are capable (financially and 
otherwise) of turning to the private sector for help. There is a 
strong sense of how ‘wrong’ this is, and the CPs had no 
confidence that the clients they assess, and do not meet their 
service criteria, would have another service to turn to.  
“… you sort of have to be the right amount of unwell to get 
a service. If you are ill enough that you’re thinking of killing 
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yourself, you’ll get taken on … if they aren’t unwell enough 
to be thinking of killing themselves or they have enough 
protective factors in place, they don’t get taken on by 
secondary care … often IAPT isn’t enough so they just fall 
through the gap and it’s only if they have access to enough 
funds to pay for private therapy, which is expensive, that 
they can get that help. That doesn’t seem right to me at all” 
(Jem, 64-65; 72-75).  
Participants expressed a reoccurring difficulty wherein a client has 
an identifiable need but is rejected by the wider service criteria 
and the opportunity to help is taken from the CP. It may not be 
ethical in fact for their service to see them, perhaps due to the 
need being for long-term trauma-focused therapy and the service 
being brief in design, but the awareness of no alternative space 
existing for the client means they don’t ‘belong’ anywhere. 
“… you can see that there’s a need, but you know that it 
isn’t your service that can fill that, and you know that there 
isn’t anywhere else for them to go, and that’s really 
frustrating and comes up again and again and again” (Lucy, 
210-213). 
The interface between services was identified as dysfunctional 
and frustrating for the CPs too; attempts to attain the ‘right’ 
support for a client is often unsuccessful and leave the CPs with a 
dilemma around providing support in the ‘wrong’ setting.  
“… trying to get people linked into community mental health 
teams, for example … you refer them, and nothing 
happens, or they eventually get some kind of assessment 
and then told that they don’t meet criteria … I think if 
anything within our service we over-do or over-treat or give 
more than we’re actually supposed to do on paper” (Glen, 
204-210). 
CPs providing MH support in physical health settings in particular 
reported an experience in which they plug the gaps, clients 
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coming into their service for a medical condition and this being 
their opportunity to have their psychological needs attended to, 
having not been able to access this elsewhere. For the CPs this 
meant working to ensure that they provided a service within the 
boundary of their competence and engaging with additional work 
to do so. They may be seeing a client due to their HIV status for 
example, but the client’s need is around disordered eating, and 
having not been able to access specialist ‘eating disorder 
services’ the CP feels a responsibility to provide what they can in 
this regard, but first must equip themselves with the skills beyond 
what is usually required in their role.  
“… sometimes people come to hospital having been unable 
to get services elsewhere … history of not being able to get 
therapy, despite her best efforts … so it put me under an 
ethical obligation to do quite a bit of reading about the 
treatment so that I would not be operating outside my area 
of competence” (Dariusz, 88; 92-93; 96-97).  
The dangerousness of a bounce-back-referrals culture in the 
system was also highlighted, the consequences of overloaded 
services feeling pressured to reject and maintain a tight remit 
being significant risk of harm to the clients.  
“I’m seeing someone who has very complex needs 
because no one else will see him, over and above the call 
of duty … you end up having to try to pick up those pieces, 
try to advocate for them and in this case we got there and 
luckily his overdose wasn’t successful, but it so easily could 
have been” (Glen, 233-237).  
The CPs also spoke to how pressured services ‘water down’ 
interventions, which can leave clients blaming themselves for ‘not 
doing well enough in therapy’ when the fault lies with the reduced 
provision of service.  
“I’m aware that I don’t have an ethical duty to go an extra 
mile for patients, but I feel that my values take me to that 
58 
 
place, I see people whose lives have been horrendous and 
I think that mental health services are in a really difficult 
place and we have things like waiting list targets pulling us 
towards offering less and less to people and I just won’t do 
it” (Lydia, 68-72).  
Participants identified that their own services were implementing 
barriers to access to manage the resource-demand pressure and 
spoke of punitive action being taken to manage waiting lists, 
rejecting the people who were often most in need and citing their 
difficulty as the reason for denial (e.g., instability), exclusionary 
policies being weaponised paradoxically. CPs attempts to 
challenge this were threatening and experienced as an attack on 
the system’s efforts to cope, resulting in denigration of the CPs 
themselves.  
“… we were already having to make decisions about how to 
manage waiting lists and how to keep them manageable 
and that involved putting in structures that did undoubtably 
make it harder for people to access services” (Lucy, 90-92).  
“I felt like policies were being applied inconsistently and 
they wanted to deny this person access to a service, and I 
felt that was really unfair … I was seen as argumentative” 
(Darla, 152-155).   
An uncomfortable hypocrisy was noted by participants, in which 
there is a societal and political promotion of good MH but no 
sufficient scaffolding structures through which services can meet 
the promises made.  
“So, on one hand we’re advocating mental health and we’re 
talking about World Mental Health Day and we’re trying to 
invite people in to address their mental health needs- I think 
we have to ask the question, are we fully equipped to even 
meet these needs of the people that are walking through 
those doors, the volume of people?” (Bina, 218-221).  
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3.2.2. Subtheme: Cultural Harm  
A second subtheme arose concerning the issues and challenges 
related to, and arising from, the gaps and access difficulties 
described above. This subtheme speaks to the consequences of 
such issues, the harm that occurs through, and is reproduced by, 
the system. This harm arises at the level of the individual and 
beyond and is linked to the way the system is organised (its 
oversight, time pressures, its narrow focus) and operates 
(hierarchically, powerfully).  
Participants identified themselves, personally and professionally, 
as valuing patient-centred care. This value was frequently 
compromised through the dehumanising attempts to manage the 
demand-resource difficulty, during which a client is stripped of 
their personhood.  
Kerrie: “In those compromises is there anything that's 
being lost?” 
Lucy:  “The thing that springs to mind that I 
immediately wanted to say, and then I didn’t want to say it 
because I almost don’t want to say it out loud is that the 
thing that’s been lost is the client as the individual” (62-64). 
People become numbers; clients become targets and clinicians 
become a means through which targets can be met.  
“… it feels really horrible to me as a person, as a 
psychologist, but ultimately people are bed numbers” (Kat, 
153-154).   
This was felt to be something that has developed over time, the 
client’s individuality eroding with the ever-increasing focus on 
numbers and the creeping commercialisation of a nationalised 
health service. For the CPs this brought forth a questioning of their 
place in the system.  
“… there is this dilemma of being in a career where it’s now 
turning into- rather than client-focused it’s more number 
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crunching, no time to really see the client for who they are” 
(Bina, 125-127).  
The politicisation of the NHS was also considered to contribute to 
this removal of personhood, positioned as an entity bigger and 
more important than those it’s meant to serve. 
“… politicians talk about the NHS in such a politicised way 
and it’s really depressing because what you lose then is 
actual people, who need support and need help” (Jem, 
344-346). 
This erosion was illustrated by the loss of agency felt by clients 
and CPs, for example clients being prescribed group therapy and 
clinicians being asked to withhold individual therapy regardless of 
clinical opinion, directed by service restraints rather than NICE 
guidance. The participants felt this pressure to not give what they 
thought would be best was cruel and unfair, the wants of the 
service influencing decisions beyond the needs of the clients. The 
connection between the CPs and their teams was further severed 
as they were left needing to defend and advocate for their client, 
rescue them from the service itself. Services being run to meet 
their own needs does not work, however, and in the long-term the 
demand is not managed at all.  
“… and then you’re wondering why they’re back, but it’s 
because you haven’t actually addressed their issues you’ve 
addressed the goals of the service rather than the client” 
(Bina, 191-193).  
The personhood of CPs themselves was also invalidated, 
conformity promoted, and difference rejected, instructing clinicians 
to assimilate. 
“I think there’s such an emphasis on following certain 
models and no space to kind of be different and I think 
when you are someone who perhaps is seeing differently, I 
feel like that’s quite hard because then you become 
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faceless or invisible and just another kind of cog in a 
machine rather than a real person” (Asmita, 68-71). 
‘Do no harm’ was another core principle specified by these CPs. 
The systems they were operating within and their cultural 
practices were felt to threaten this integral value regularly. The 
norms were relational and systemic and practices such as 
providing ‘ECT for anxiety’ were identified as overwhelmingly 
difficult to witness and challenge.  
“… just the whole ethos of the place, the whole culture … 
practice was seen as normal and good but did not feel 
ethical and did not feel right and did not feel like best 
practice to me and did not feel like we were helping people 
in the best way that we could, it felt like we were harming 
people (.) quite regularly” (Rupert, 118-122). 
This witnessing of poor clinical practice was a significant shared 
experience, one that left CPs felt powerless to combat, but there 
was an understanding as to why it may occur: multidisciplinary 
colleagues often pushing clients away out of fear, under pressure. 
The ‘cliché’ of crisis services encouraging suicidal clients to have 
a cup of tea or run a bath was offered as an example of when no 
framework for thinking is utilised, in a context where the 
consequences can be so catastrophic, but the staff-experience is 
one so overwhelmed that the CPs extended compassion to their 
colleagues with less access to the training and resources 
(supervision; frameworks for understanding) that the CPs 
themselves had.  
“I think one of the biggest ethical dilemmas that people face 
at the moment is watching colleagues provide something 
that you think is substandard at best, and at worst is doing 
harm … they’re doing is stuck in a system that holds a 
really horrible narrative about people that need help”” 
(Lydia, 382-384; 450).  
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Participants also spoke to the wider, societal influences on their 
ability to do their jobs the way they would wish to, and how our 
healthcare system can reinforce inequalities and social 
determinants of distress. The current functioning of the NHS does 
not allow these CPs to practice in accordance with social justice 
values.  
“… social justice ought to be part of our professional values 
because I don’t see how we can help people when they’re 
distressed without paying proper attention to the systems 
that arguably contribute to and maintain that distress” (Jem, 
28-31). 
The CPs referenced Maslow’s ‘hierarchy of needs’ (Maslow, 1943) 
and the dilemma around providing therapy to clients whose social 
circumstances are such unstable states – unsafe housing, 
sanctioned income benefits – that it may in fact be unethical to 
engage in a psychotherapy, but the alternative is perceived as 
‘nothing’, no support whatsoever, the CPs experiencing a sense of 
powerlessness to do much about the former. There is a 
continuous cost-benefit analysis, attempting to calculate what 
could provide some benefit for the client, alongside what it is they 
would like help with.   
“… we’re ultimately trying to help them to manage a 
situation that they shouldn’t be in and I think it’s around the 
social care structure that’s around people. I think our 
society has been decimated in terms of people’s safety 
nets … it’s that really basic concept of Maslow’s hierarchy 
of needs, that bottom tier of things just isn’t being met” 
(Lucy, 106-110). 
These social inequalities, affecting an overwhelming amount of 
the clients these CPs encounter, are experienced as barriers to 
the clinical work, preventing CPs from using (and clients making 
use of) their core therapeutic skills. The most impactful 
intervention for one CP would be to effect political change that 
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could have a more macro-level impact by aiding the housing 
budget, for example. 
“I think as a psychologist it’s very difficult to do meaningful 
work when you are sending somebody back home to 
cockroach-ridden, temporary accommodation … we’re 
talking Maslow’s hierarchy here … get the Tories out and 
increase the housing budget in [borough] and that would 
have the best impact on mental health, in my opinion” 
(Duncan, 185-187; 189; 192-193). 
The profession of clinical psychology itself is not considered 
innocent. A lack of diversity in identities and subsequent 
discriminatory practices is named and considered for its own role 
in maintaining how inaccessible our services are for the many.  
“I’m also aware that at a sort of deeply embedded, sort of 
systemic level of course there is prejudice … I’m aware that 
we’re a very white profession, I’m aware that most of my 
clients are white. So, I am aware that inherent in what we 
do somewhere along the line we’re not getting it, we’re not 
managing to serve all the people in our community. So, in 
terms of social justice I like to hope that at a personal level 
there are things I do to try and tackle that but professionally 
and systemically I think there are probably things that we’re 
doing that are maintaining the injustice, and I hate it and it 
sits really uncomfortably” (Jem, 83-93).  
The impact of political weaponizing of the NHS was revisited in 
this context of the damage done to clients and CPs when a 
deliberate underfunding occurs. A pained workforce makes poor 
decisions, and everyone suffers. One participant spoke to the 
narratives that follow ‘scandals of abuse’ in healthcare which 
individualise the problem and produce recommendations, 
legislations, and training which never address the systemic cause.  
“… and you know when they say about ‘oh the NHS isn’t 
meeting it’s targets’ well, no, yeah, that’s because you’ve 
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underfunded us quite severely, and then the implication, or 
the way it can be easily interpreted, is it’s because we’re 
not working hard enough or we’re doing a poor job and it 
really sickens me … what I see is the impact of a system 
where everyone’s stressed, everyone’s underfunded, 
undertrained, under-resourced. So, you’ve got staff that feel 
powerless and trapped and take it out on people they 
shouldn’t … it comes from a place of being dragged down 
and dragged down and dragged down and I think that’s 
how these bad decisions get made” (Jem, 346-358; 364-5).  
Powerful emotional content is elicited here, the CP is sickened. 
Strong emotion – anger in particular – arises even for the most 
senior and experienced of CPs who feel at a loss regarding 
influencing change and culture. There was a consensus that the 
client suffers whilst the system’s stasis is prioritised; CPs 
reassured themselves that they can only make change from within 
but this belief waivers as the challenges persist.   
“I feel that what we’re doing at the moment is privileging our 
relationship with the system, feeling that that’s for the 
greater good, that if we’re in it at least we can influence 
somewhere, but over the service-user experience. As 
experienced as I am, I still haven’t found a way to grasp 
that” (Lydia, 396-399). 
 
3.3. Theme Two: Power 
 
Joining and working in these systems is an emotional experience for the 
CPs. The frustration of attempting to navigate the dilemmas explored 
above, and the powerlessness expressed, can lead to a difficulty 




“It’s hard, it’s hard to be a psychologist sometimes when you’re 
working in psychiatry and not be outraged” (Drew, 94-5).  
Navigating the aetiological tensions amongst teams and the extent to 
which psychological formulation is welcomed has led these participants 
to dread attending meetings, expecting their input will be rejected and 
their advocacy for the client unsuccessful. These premonitions are 
physiologically strongly felt.  
“When you’re predicting that there’s going to be a conflict, you get 
anxiety symptoms don’t you … right in your chest” (Drew, 201-2).  
The impact of being joined with other professionals who appear to be 
rigidly engaging with unethical practices, and that sense of therefore not 
being able to trust your colleagues, was experienced by numerous 
participants as a betrayal, an abandoning of the core values of the 
‘helping professions’, and a threat to one’s own integrity.  
“… it’s devastating … it can feel like a big betrayal… suddenly you 
feel very unsafe, you feel very much on your own, and yeah it 
affects your motivation and everything, how you feel in the job, 
how you are feeling within the profession” (Rupert, 103; 106; 109-
111).  
Demoralisation, despondency, and despair were threaded through the 
participants accounts. The CPs were also conscious of their own 
privilege if they themselves had ‘escaped’ similar experiences to their 
clients, such as poverty, and were left with a survivor’s guilt, unable to 
pull their socially disadvantaged clients to safety.  
“That sense of powerlessness can be really quite depressing I 
think, it’s hard not to get completely deflated” (Lucy, 136-7). 
Numerous CPs named an uncomfortableness with speaking on these 
dilemmas; it felt safe to do so only due to the protections afforded by 
anonymisation. What we’re allowed to admit about the state of NHS MH 
services and their inaccessibility appeared particularly troublesome, a 
difficulty admitting the concessions CPs have made to their preferred 
ways of practicing, and fears around the future of the profession. 
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“I’m glad you said this is anonymised … I don’t think it is 
controversial, but I probably wouldn’t be allowed to say it and be 
named for it … so I feel a bit anxious about saying it” (Jem, 63; 
66-67). 
“I’m noticing that this is harder to talk about than I thought it would 
be … even though I know I’m anonymous, I’m noticing I’m anxious 
right here [points], there is a knot in my stomach that feels like I’m 
saying something that I shouldn’t be saying” (Lucy, 150; 329-331). 
Perceived compromised integrity was a significantly distressing 
experience for the CPs. Examples included being forced to implement a 
plan that felt not true to their value of patient-centred care, senior staff 
enforcing a decision that both the clinician and client experienced as 
threatening. For the CPs this often felt like an alarm bell, bringing forth 
anxiety around these instances being repeated.  
“The job that we do is emotionally demanding and trying to do it in 
a way that maintains your own integrity and the professional and 
personal values that we all came into this profession wanting to 
live out, it’s really tiring and I’m not sure it should be quite that 
tiring” (Jem, 372-376).  
The relentless need to protect their integrity is exhausting and impacts on 
the wellbeing of the CPs to a significant degree. Their awareness of how 
clients’ whole lives are impacted by the decisions of others, and the CPs 
powerlessness to intervene, can cause great alarm for their own 
psychological wellbeing.  
“… it felt devastating … my colleagues really noticed; they were 
like ‘are you alright? You’re not your usual self, what’s going on?’ 
And I think this case in particular highlighted that dilemma in the 
system … this problem in general, it wasn’t just a one-off thing 
that could be resolved it was this issue, now with real life 
consequences for this woman’s freedom and her wellbeing … it 
was that again and again with other cases … felt a bit maddening, 
it felt like I was going a bit crazy” (Rupert, 220; 222- 227; 251).  
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A concern for what CPs are made to do by complying with the 
institutional procedures emerged, their formulation of a client’s history 
lending itself to an understanding of what harm they may be replicating.  
Kerrie: “How did it leave you feeling?” 
Asmita: “I felt quite sad for her, and I felt angry about who I 
was becoming in relation to people in her early life, I’d let her 
down … and these ideas of kind of coming into the profession and 
doing no harm and having integrity in what you do I think that was 
completely at odds with what I was doing in the moment” 148-
151).  
 
3.3.1. Subtheme: Top-Down  
The CPs sense of power was relative. They shared a belief that 
whilst their managers were the conduits for everyday systemic 
frustrations, they were ultimately enforcing something that was 
produced from above them. The ‘hands tied’ narrative reoccurred 
throughout the dataset and was framed as ‘par for the course’. 
The experience of having decisions overruled, the therapeutic 
relationship not being given weight when faced with waiting times 
for example, was nonetheless a hard one to bare, particularly 
when the impact on the client was witnessed.  
“… but my hands were tied ultimately, I couldn’t make that 
decision and I’m now sitting on the side-line watching this 
client disengage. It’s difficult” (Bina, 104-5).  
The overarching need to manage waiting lists with limited 
resources pushes ethical decision-making to the side, or below, 
and that is a precedent set by the very highest of boards.  
“I think it comes down higher up … so I think people’s 
hands are tied when it comes to ethics and morality, I don’t 
think that’s been thought about much higher up and I think 
that comes from politics” (Asmita, 93-97). 
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The potential for local change therefore feels scare, efforts often 
thwarted by the power holders and a mandate for change 
withheld, resulting in no movement on the ground. The ‘concrete 
ceiling’ is impenetrable and the cultural resistance to reflection 
and difference is maintained. 
“But because the power comes from higher up you’ve got 
this kind of- it’s not a glass ceiling, it’s a concrete ceiling. 
Until people in control, people in charge, want to 
acknowledge that there is a different way of thinking, you 
can’t get the staff on board” (Drew, 152-155). 
By virtue of being a client, receiving a service, power is 
imbalanced. When considering clients’ positions in society too, 
their trauma and complex needs, it feels unjust to these CPs to be 
offering such limited services, unable to verbalise their wish to 
provide the client with more when that’s what they believe the 
client needs, leaving the client to interpret the problem as inside 
them.  
“… colluding essentially with this idea, leaving the patient 
feeling like it’s their fault when it’s something that’s going 
on higher up” (Asmita, 104-5). 
Ultimately, for these CPs power and change feels very much out 
of reach, uncaring, and non-responsive. The client’s resultant 
experience perhaps not too dissimilar. There is agreement that at 
the most macro of levels a powerful message exists which acts as 
a barrier to the therapeutic work of CPs: distress is pathological, 
and healthy people contribute to our economy.  
“It is about society isn’t it, that actually if as a society we 
give messages about not tolerating distress, that we feel 
better and we should be happy and we should have stuff, 





3.3.2. Subtheme: Resistance and its Costs 
Participants sought to manage their emotional experience of 
ethical dilemmas through advocacy; advocating for what they felt 
was best for the client, and in turn advocating for their own needs 
to be met by finding a way to live out their values in practice. This 
was often framed as fighting back against the oppressive 
structures of the NHS system and MH services, going into battle 
with those with more power who they expected to shout them 
down 
“I went into this meeting expecting a fight on my hands” 
(Drew, 212). 
The witnessing of poor clinical practice described in ‘Subtheme: 
Cultural Harm’ can require CPs to enact moral courage and 
engage in internal safeguarding reporting that requires the CP to 
withstand backlash from their team, and anger from their 
management when they’re scrutinised. One CP understood the 
anger and aggression they experienced through Social Identity 
Theory, they were outside of the social group, not engaging with 
the group’s norms, and this meant enduring an attack from within 
one’s own team, with the dispiriting potential for no good to come 
of it.  
“… when I had to take it to a higher level in the Trust there 
was a lot of anger from my team and I got somewhat 
rejected from the team … the whistle-blower ends up kind 
of falling on their sword … you end up feeling a little bit 
empty” (Drew, 251-256). 
This is a battle for what matters to the CPs: personhood, patient 
choice; one that meant not submitting to what does not feel right.  
“… fighting for that, rather than just going along with what I 
am required to do” (Asmita, 141-2). 
The CPs recognised limits to their power and their influence but 
resolved to resist.  
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“… it really worries me, I’m not quite sure what to do about 
it other than fight it as best I can at the level I can” (Jem, 
243). 
However, challenging the harmful narratives and working to 
influence a culture change is emotionally demanding and requires 
the CPs to actively choose to do so. 
“… I take a deep breath and I challenge … but you do 
really have to fight. You have to really actively pay attention 
to it and it’s exhausting, it’s really tiring, and I think that’s 
part of it, it’s the fatigue of it all. You have to make a 
decision every day to do battle” (Jem, 370-373).  
Taking this stand comes with a risk, of rejection and attack from 
the system, a rebuke that encourages CPs to think twice about 
staying with this ethical stance, but the risk appears necessary if 
CPs hope to maintain their personal and professional values.  
“I think when you do take a stand or kind of bring up 
morality or ethics about the work that we’re doing and 
whether things are kind of in line with the party line of the 
service I think you can get a little backlash … there’s a 
pressure to kind of conform or adhere to very business-like, 
kind of neo-liberal ideas that are driving therapies … to me, 
becoming a psychologist was what I described before 
about kind of the integrity with which you go into the 
profession but I think there’s a real tension for me that 
somehow I’m having to kind of fight for that a lot, and that 
can feel quite exhausting” (Asmita, 55-6; 59-63). 
Fighting against these pressures to deny a service, provide less 
yet do more is a continuous battle, it drains them, but the CPs 
agree the alternative is unbearable. 




Lydia:  “… it’s not easy but I ask myself all the time 
what would the alternative be and the alternative would be 
offering a bit of a [expletive] service to loads of people and 
pretending that that’s psychology, and it isn’t” (108-110). 
 
3.4. Theme Three: Professional Identity 
 
When considering the alignment of personal and professional values, 
and the extent to which these are facilitated in clinical practice, a difficulty 
for these CPs was identified surrounding embodying the profession. A 
primary concern was the ownership of clinical psychology’s Code of 
Ethics and Conduct, written by the BPS, an organisation CPs are not 
required to subscribe to, and yet set the standard for clinical psychology 
ethical practice.  
“I mean, there’s like the BPS guidelines and there’s the HCPC as 
the registering body but that’s always felt very messy to me, cause 
I was a member of the BPS but decided to leave … but the HCPC 
does not have a psychology code of ethics, the Code comes from 
the BPS, it’s a BPS document, developed by the BPS, updated by 
the BPS, overseen by the BPS, so that feels very messy … the 
BPS sort of oversees what it means to be a psychologist and what 
is deemed sort of ethical and good practice as a psychologist, so 
that feels very messy and I think problematic” (Rupert, 36-40; 44-
50). 
Concerns regarding the representation of clinical psychology through the 
BPS were also voiced, some participants anxious about an atmosphere 
of acceptance surrounding the increased medicalisation of clinical 
psychology (for example the debates around psychology prescribers), 
whilst others were alarmed by the lack of presence of thought for ethical 
dilemmas in BPS communications.  
Ethical dilemmas, and the often inherently political nature of them, were 
not felt to be a headline issue for the profession’s leadership but for 
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these CPs there is a real wish for the profession to come together on this 
and speak more openly about moral conflicts, combat the taboo, and 
consider these real, everyday issues psychologists are facing, alone.  
“… shows a dilemma in the profession, this confusion around who 
is our governing body and who is the leadership within the 
profession, and then this huge dissatisfaction with them … and 
then just feeling on an individual level like you are very much left 
on your own in these unethical sort of quandaries that you’re 
having to negotiate and feeling like that is not really even on the 
BPS agenda” (Rupert, 396-405).  
The perception of CPs as upstanding, inherently moral clinicians was 
considered unhelpful, setting CPs up to fail when they can’t hold back 
their human messiness. The instruments used during the doctoral course 
selection process contributed to this narrative of CPs’ superior ethical 
judgement.   
“When you are applying to do clinical psychology you have to do 
these kind of situational judgement tests to get onto different 
courses and that kind of gives you this idea that psychologists 
must be very moral, must have lots of integrity, must be very noble 
and have like the best judgements and I think that’s not real, 
psychologists are messy and they’re complicated, they get things 
wrong, and I just wish that we would kind of sit with that a bit more 
and acknowledge that” (Asmita, 183-189)  
Engaging with ethical dilemmas regularly, together, is not something 
these CPs felt was occurring. The experience was very much an 
isolated, individualised one, with little collective thought as to the 
emotional impact on CPs. Multiple participants suggested supervision 
was a space in which this could be more proactively welcomed.  
“I think actually we probably don’t as a profession reflect on the 
moral dilemmas enough, on the ethical dilemmas enough … it 
almost needs to be a supervision agenda item … I’m not sure- 
apart from this- that I’ve ever really spoken about some of the- 
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about how uncomfortable it feels, it’s [spoken about] more from a 
practical point of view” (Kat, 392-393; 399-403).  
The rigidity some CPs experienced around what is a psychologist’s job, 
how they should be spending their time, contributed to the participants’ 
sense of helplessness. A more community-focused framework offers 
flexibility, allowing CPs to act in accordance with their values.  
“… there is so much we can and should be doing, from voting to 
lobbying to writing letters to speaking out on social media where 
appropriate, and then all the way through to our day-to-day clinical 
work and advocating for the people we support” (Jem, 528-530).  
Participants often placed their hope for change in the new generation of 
CPs and the push for diversifying training recruitment. This reliance 
however seems to stem from the idea that to change the system we must 
be in it but negates the responsibility of the leaders perpetuating 
problems; the new generation cannot overhaul the profession without a 
mandate, and action, from the top.  
“I think there’s this huge drive now with people entering the 
profession to kind of do something different or to make it more 
varied or diverse and I think they’re missing the point, change 
should be coming from people from the top because they’re the 
ones sustaining the problem, it’s not the people with less power” 
(Asmita, 260-263). 
 
3.4.1. Subtheme: Like It or Lump It 
The consequences of experiences spoken to in Themes One and 
Two, and the professional disconnectedness noted in Theme 
Three, are stark. Eleven out of the fourteen participants shared a 
dilemma around remaining in their posts, and/or in the NHS. 
Three had left previous posts for reasons relating to Subtheme: 
Cultural Harm. Another three had begun to do part-time work 
outside of the NHS and framed this as necessary for their 
wellbeing, private practice providing the opportunity to work in line 
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with professional values (such as ‘the client as an individual’). 
They commented on having to leave the NHS to do work they can 
be proud of and protect their identities. 
“… something shifted within the NHS, within psychology. 
So, it’s almost a case of you either stick at it and lump it, or 
you leave” (Bina, 130-131). 
There was talk of entering posts with hopes of ‘turning things 
around’ but when constrained by structure and hierarchy being 
unable to make full use of their skills and training some felt 
defeated; an accumulative effect was noted by all.  
“I think there’s probably this background erosion of my 
sense of efficacy, I won’t deny that I’m leaving this service 
in four weeks and that’s one of the reasons I’m going” 
(Duncan, 228-229).  
But leaving the NHS is not an easy or simple choice, for some this 
too would feel unethical, and their patients would be left with no 
advocate.  
“If that’s one way to deal with the ethical dilemma, is to 
leave, then where does that leave all those patients who 
don’t have someone fighting their corner?” (Sara, 248-250). 
Concerns linger however as to what the system does to these 
CPs, how when faced with such powerful structures clinicians who 
may have previously held strong ethical convictions can be 
corrupted. Jem points out that psychologists too can fall foul to 
conformity.  
“… just how different we are as psychologists compared to 
how we thought we were going to be and that can cause 
some kind of cognitive dissonance” (Lucy, 227-230).  
“I feel like ‘am I getting sucked further into a system, am I 
going to end up, honestly, being corrupted by it?’ I worry 
that I’ll get to a point where I buy into the stuff that I 
currently disagree with” (Jem, 327-329). 
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Participants said the retention problem epitomises what is going 
wrong in the system and they see no attempts to retain them. 
Changes to banding structures and the emphasis on leadership 
positioning for CPs has resulted in a loss of clinical experience 
which used to be disseminated; participants mourned the loss of 
nurturing support from those above them. Junior CPs had 
witnessed seniors become exhausted and ask themselves ‘is this 
worth it’ and were left wondering when they too would reach a 
stage of ‘enough is enough’, their relationship with the NHS and 
it’s MH provision becoming too strained, taking too much from 
them. The CPs expressed guilt and pain for even considering 
leaving, referencing the privileged position afforded to CPs who 
are paid to train by the NHS, but they anticipate having to walk 
away, reaching a point where their need to survive takes 
precedence.  
“You kind of end up in this strangely abusive relationship 
with the NHS, it has given me so much, so many 
opportunities that I would have never had … so I am 
incredibly grateful but at the same time it’s like, well, when 
is enough enough? When is what it’s taking from me equal 
to or greater than what I’ve got from it? I feel a bit tearful 
thinking about that … it kind of feels like a bit of a betrayal 
(.) on both sides” (Lucy, 266-267; 271-274). 
“I’ve got all these ideas about wanting to work in the NHS 
but now I’m thinking for my own mental health I can’t. I 
can’t keep working in this way …It doesn’t fit with my 
values, I’m trying to work in a way that does but it feels like 
a fight every time … it’s exhausting, it’s really tiring, and I 
can’t feel like this at this stage” (Asmita, 197-206). 
Being in these services does something quite destructive to the 
CPs, the system’s dysfunction getting inside them, putting them in 
a position that they need to leave, escape, to be safe and well.   
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“… I needed to change that job, I remember describing I felt 
like I was in crisis again and again and I think that was part 
of the service, the acute service- it’s a crisis service but I 
ended up feeling I was in crisis working there and I think 
that was about the system” (Rupert, 281-284). 
Changing jobs appeared to be a compromise the CPs made to 
keep them in the NHS, a system they felt they needed to be in in 
order to protect their ‘socialist’ values; but the system itself was 
not living up to these and was in fact getting in the way of the CPs 
attempts to do so, and in turn taking something from them. 
Participants (notably the women) also voiced concerns about how 
remaining in the NHS, burning out and detaching from their 
values, affects their ability to parent too, to be a good friend, a 
good partner, and so it was not just themselves they needed to 
protect.  
“… socialism’s always been a really, really, really core part 
of my values and personality for as long back as I’ve been 
politically aware … and I have found myself thinking in the 
last year about what it might be like to do some private 
work (4) and it makes me shudder now but … I just cannot 
imagine myself doing this fulltime when I’m 66, 67, I’d just 
be a husk, there wouldn’t be anything left of me” (Lucy, 
244-251). 
“… thinking how hard it is to be in this position at this stage 
of my career and having at least another 30 years ahead of 
me, how can I sustain my values in a place that isn’t really 
enabling that but kind of taking them away” (Asmita, 76-79).  
 
3.4.2. Sub-Theme: What You Can When You Can  
Participants employed several strategies to try and keep 
themselves in the NHS, in their posts, to manage the emotional 
impact and the damage done to their ideals. This included trying 
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to ‘do what you can when you can’; ‘standing your ground’ and 
challenging decisions that seem inappropriate; and choosing to 
keep fighting – for their patients and for themselves. They spoke 
of holding onto ‘little wins’ and ‘golden moments’; capitalising on 
windows of opportunity for working in line with their values; and 
finding allies in the system.  
“…even if it’s a little seemingly insignificant thing it’s at least 
better than nothing, or better than an alternative which is no 
service” (Kat, 283-285). 
“the bottom line is finding a values-based approach to 
working that works for you and being reflective about that” 
(Drew, 85-89). 
“… you have to make a stand, you have to choose” (Jem, 
472). 
Attempts to resist bending to cultural norms and subsequent 
burnout included enforcing boundaries around taking a lunch 
break, for example.  
“So, I sort of see it as part of my responsibility to myself 
and to my clients to make that decision to go and have a 
break, it’s all those kinds of micro-decisions isn’t it?” (Sara, 
272-275). 
Multiple CPs cited engagement with clinical psychology social 
media commentary as keeping them away from complacency. 
Others contextualised their experience to make sense of it and 
assign responsibility for their distress externally. 
“’Okay, I’m feeling this not because there’s something 
wrong with me, but I’m feeling these things because there’s 
something wrong with the system’” (Rupert, 260-1).  
Having forums through which to stay connected to values, and 
each other, seemed important for sustainment. In Wales, no 
psychologist is alone in their service and these CPs voiced a 
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concern for their English colleagues, a worry that when alone 
conformity becomes likely. 
“When I was trained, the first thing we were told was ‘you’re 
trained to hold a different voice and a different narrative, 
that’s your job and you need to find a way to sustain that” 
(Lydia, 335-337). 
Numerous (women) CPs noticed they had to work to go against 
their more ‘well-behaved’ temperaments to become assertive and 
‘bolshy’, bending the rules, challenging the power at play and 
being ‘naughty’ to maintain their integrity and keep their values 
alive. Writing supporting letters to housing departments was one 
task that offered the CPs some reassurance.  
“I’ve discovered a rebellious streak … I’ve always been 
quite good at towing the line. So, actually for me to push 
against that is quite anxiety-provoking … it sort of feels like 
I’m breaking the rules or challenging the rule-makers, which 
I am, for good reason, but it doesn’t sit quite comfortably. 
But I suppose it feels more wrong to compromise my own 
integrity” (Jem, 280-1; 285-289). 
However, a common ‘strategy’ employed was detachment, cutting 
off to carry on. One CP expects her trainee self would be mortified 
by this, another spoke to noticing their supervisor do the same, 
and when they bring dilemmas to them it reconnects them in a 
devastating fashion: there’s validation but little solution.  
“I think to manage in that environment you have to kind of 
detach from it” (Rupert, 245).  
Using supervision, having informal rants, and ‘sticking their necks 
out’ to keep aligned with one’s values was not enough; there 
came a tipping point in which disengagement was the only 
survival mechanism.   
“There has to be a degree of blocking as well, and I can 
see the argument for that not being skilful, but you have to 
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because if I engage with this fully all the time I can’t cope 
with it, it’s too much” (Jem, 432-434). 
Two CPs spoke to an internal debate regarding their passion for 
the profession, the taboo of it being ‘just a job’ but reflected on 
how it can become such when you are up against an ‘inefficient, 
traumatising, bureaucratic machine’. 
“… ‘it’s just a job’ and yeah, I’ve just been kind of just 
wondering really how much of that is a kind of defensive 
distancing and how much of it is just kind of the reality for 




















4. CHAPTER FOUR: DISCUSSION, EVALUATION, AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
 
4.1. Aims Revisited  
 
The aims of this study were twofold. First, to explore the concept of moral 
distress with CPs who are operating within the UK’s ‘socialised’ 
healthcare system. Second, to develop an understanding of this 
psychological experience, how it is produced in this context and the 
impact it has on the CPs. To my knowledge, this study is the first 
examination of MD with UK CPs; it is hoped the results of this study can 
contribute to the literature surrounding ethical clinical practice for UK CPs 
and bring the emotional experience into the fore.  
In the previous chapter, three overarching themes and six subthemes 
were presented following a TA of interview data from 14 CPs. Whilst the 
presentation of the themes suggests a distinct nature, there is interaction 
between them all. 
 
4.2. Summary of Findings 
 
Participants’ experiences of ethical dilemmas, and the emotive aspect of 
managing these, were situated within their services, their systems. They 
experienced conflicts between their personal and professional values 
and the institutional practices which constrained them. Always striving to 
‘do the right thing’ the CPs were frequently hindered in their ability to help 
by the gaps in service provision, and the inaccessibility of that which 
does exist. They could not help some clients because their service 
criteria would not allow them entry, but there was no alternative service 
to offer them and so some rebellion was required of the CPs, finding a 
way to offer something rather than nothing. The pressure on these 
systems meant services were rejecting and denying clients a service, 
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applying policies inconsistently, and the CPs were left powerless, unable 
to do anything other than witness this.  
The culture of these systems was described by the participants as 
harmful. Clients were stripped of their personhood and assigned a 
numerical category, a dehumanising attempt to manage the imbalance of 
demands and resources whilst a socialised healthcare system 
experiences ever-increasing commercialisation. Clients and clinicians 
alike lost agency, the services’ need to survive prevailing above patient 
choice and control. Participants expressed concern for their own future 
practice, how they may be corrupted by the system and what their 
conformity may mean for their clients, their energy for fighting against the 
system being depleted.  
For many, what got in the way of them doing their therapeutic job the 
way they wanted to were the impoverished circumstances in which their 
clients were stuck. Poor housing, lack of financial aid, the basic needs 
were not being met for many and the powerlessness the CPs felt around 
combatting this was a significant source of frustration and distress. Being 
in services also meant fighting against aetiological frameworks and 
business models through which clients were no longer considered to be 
whole people; this type of ‘treatment’ was experienced by the CPs as a 
betrayal of the helping-professions’ core values.  
Throughout the participants’ accounts there was despondency, despair, 
demoralisation in response to how immovable cultural practices seemed. 
There was a shared exhaustion, a continuous fight to maintain one’s 
integrity, a relentlessness that tired the participants beyond what seemed 
acceptable. The CPs were powerfully impacted by the ethical dilemmas 
they were facing time and time again, to the extent the systems hurt 
them too. Rupert, for example, shared how “it felt like I was going a bit 
crazy” (line 251), and Lucy worries that staying in the NHS will leave her 
“a husk” (line 251).  
Advocacy was championed by most of the participants as a means by 
which to manage the dilemmas and the threat to the self. This required 
the participants to fight, to challenge the system they were a part of, this 
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a battle for what matters to the CPs and the clients they were trying to 
help. The limits to their power however often meant ‘doing what you can 
when you can’, and the extent to which this was satisfactory varied.  
A key theme arose concerning the ethos of clinical psychology, its ethical 
priorities, and a lack of coherence as a profession regarding this. 
Participants raised concerns around who is determining the profession’s 
ethical and professional values - an organisation currently and publicly in 
turmoil (Dixon, 2021) - and what role the professional body plays in 
embedding these.  
Most participants spoke to the retention dilemma in the profession, their 
deliberations around remaining in the NHS or leaving for private practice 
often framed as an attempt to be in control of their impact, being able to 
work as the psychologist they want to be. Contemplating leaving the 
NHS was painful too, a position they never expected to find themselves 
in, a complex relationship having developed between the CPs and the 
NHS. To leave would be to abandon the clients that could not access 
help privately. To leave would be to abandon the CP’s own egalitarian 
views. To leave would be to betray the organisation that trained them. 
But, to stay risked further deterioration in the CPs own mental health. To 
stay risked remaining powerless and unable to use their full set of skills 
to truly help. To stay risked becoming what they fear, perpetuating harm.  
 
4.3. Discussion of Findings 
 
4.3.1. Integrity 
When asked what comes to mind when thinking about the 
professional values of clinical psychology half of the participants 
immediately named ‘integrity’; person-centred care and ‘do no 
harm’ closely followed as the key components of their professional 
identity. They described how this integrity was compromised in 
their accounts. Varcoe et al.'s (2012) definition of MD situated this 
compromised moral agency as a core component of the MD 
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experience. Multiple previous studies (Hamric et al., 2012; Hamric 
& Blackhall, 2007; Meltzer & Huckabay, 2004; Piers et al., 2012) 
identified an association between compromised integrity and 
leaving a healthcare post, a relationship that was spoken to with 
the CPs here too. Indeed, the findings herein support the 
distinction between MD and burnout provided by Fantus et al. 
(2017), burnout being a phenomenon not concerned with ethical 
integrity whereas this is central to the MD experience, as 
illustrated by the CPs.  
MD, as an occupational phenomenon, is grounded in disruption to 
professional identity (Austin et al., 2005). Integrity seemed to be 
central to much of how the CPs framed their experiences. What 
we mean by integrity is therefore important to consider; it is likely 
to entail moral uprightness, being whole and in an uncorrupted 
state. It’s literal definition speaks to honesty and holding strongly 
onto moral principles which you do not veer from (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2021). Integrity can be such an embodied entity that 
we attend to it more so when it is threatened or thwarted (Zahavi, 
1999). Austin et al.'s (2005) investigation of MD with Canadian 
psychologists referenced the ‘need to be able to look in the 
mirror’, which was echoed by the CPs here who noticed that their 
younger selves would not like what they saw of their current 
practice, and the detachment they engaged with allowed some 
temporary reprieve from facing this.  
4.3.2. Compromising Situations 
The CPs felt their personal and professional values were most 
often compromised by the current state and structure of the NHS’s 
MH provision. This was not a finding that closely replicated 
previous literature on MD but rather spoke to the specific UK 
healthcare context wherein a ‘socialised’ system is at the mercy of 
government funding and commissioning decisions which have 
significant consequences, barriers going up to prevent large 
groups of people (with more ‘moderate’ needs) from accessing 
services which are broadly mild (IAPT) or severe (CMHT).  
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What does follow previous studies however is the experience of 
feeling compromised by what one witnesses. In Whitehead et al.'s 
(2015) multidisciplinary survey, witnessing ‘diminished care’ 
ranked highly as a source of MD and poor communication was 
implicated. The CPs in this study echoed this, citing tension 
amongst professionals with differing aetiological frameworks, 
whose formulation of a client appeared pathologising or 
uncompassionate to the CPs, leading to concerns about what care 
their clients were receiving. Attempts to navigate this, explore their 
colleague’s thinking, were often frustrating and the culturally 
embedded narratives seemed immovable, resulting in repeated 
cycles of (perceived) inefficient care.  
4.3.3.  Experiencing Values Conflict 
The CPs’ personal and professional values were aligned, many 
referenced this being what brought them into the profession, but in 
clinical practice these values are constrained, and the CPs felt a 
pressure to comply, toe the line, violate their own standards and 
principles in order to keep the service going. This idea around 
working ‘for the good of the many’ seemed a fallacy, perpetuated 
to keep the CPs going. The needs of the service, its economics, 
and its own anxieties, wiped out the needs of the clients; the CPs 
could empathise with their managers, who were experiencing 
constraints too, but ultimately experienced what they enforced as 
a threat to their integrity.  
The CPs named despair, despondency and disheartenment, all of 
which seemed linked to their sense of powerlessness – a 
fundamental characteristic of MD (Hamric, 2012; L. C. Musto et 
al., 2015). The resultant exhaustion reflected the dispiritedness 
noted by Austin et al. (2003) 
The role of control was also implicated; Dodek et al.'s (2016) study 
found that their physicians – holding the highest authority on 
decision making and therefore the most ‘in control’ – expressed 
the lowest levels of MD. The CPs were seeking autonomy and 
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control, so they may practice in line with their values, and this led 
to the consideration of private practice for some.  
The fear of conformity, voiced by the CPs, concerning who they 
could become should they remain in this system much longer was 
not something discovered in the scoping review as a feature of 
MD but it logically follows as a consequence; when our 
professional integrity is compromised and we do not like how we 
are being made to practice, we might worry where this will lead 
and what kind of psychologist one might become. The women in 
the sample also shared concerns around how, with the personal 
and professional being so linked, this transformation into 
something less-compassionate, less-human/more-machine, would 
impact on their whole person too, their family and friends.  
4.3.4. Managing Conflicts 
The CPs attempts to manage the conflicts between their values 
and the institutional procedures centred around resistance, 
resisting the oppressive structures and the attempt to force the 
CPs out of alignment. This was framed as a battle, a fight a CP 
had to choose to enter in to. This finding brought forth ideas about 
moral courage and Rathert et al.'s (2016) work; the extent to 
which the CPs could persevere and motivate themselves to 
challenge what is constraining them and their clients, in the face of 
such adverse circumstances, is their moral-efficacy, which in turn 
influences moral courage – converting their intentions into actions, 
despite the pressure to be subservient. Holding onto ‘golden 
moments’ and ‘little wins’ seemed to aid this perseverance.  
However, there was consensus amongst the CPs that these 
compromising experiences and the distress that follows has an 
accumulative effect – a crescendo effect perhaps (Epstein & 
Hamric, 2009); a moral residue than lingers and gathers, a 
reminder of having not abided by one’s own moral standards. 
Detachment was deployed as a means of protecting the CPs from 
this crescendo, desensitising them to the moral aspects of their 
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impact (Bandura, 2012). Some CPs expressed a discomfort with 
this disengagement, whilst others viewed it as a necessity borne 
from the reality of current NHS practices.   
The ultimate mechanism by which the CPs could manage their 
MD experience was to leave their job or leave the NHS. However, 
leaving the NHS itself was fraught with moral implications. Three 
participants did not consider employing such a strategy, and 
notably had more years of experience. Two of these gave less 
emotive accounts of their ethical dilemmas and expressed a more 
external locus of control, assigning the responsibility for ethical 
practice more so to their service and systems than themselves. 
The third was in a powerful position and had more influence on 
their system’s practices than the majority of the sample. The MD 
levels of these three participants appeared lower, or perhaps 
‘more managed’; indeed Whitehead et al. (2015) found that MD is 
lower in clinicians who have never considered leaving a position.  
4.3.5. NHS Principles and Values 
Associated with integrity are ideas about ‘doing the right thing’ and 
so we should consider what that looks like and its location within 
individual value systems. In producing a charter of principles and 
values (Department of Health and Social Care, 2021), the NHS 
tells us what they think it means to ‘do’ healthcare right. These 
principles include ensuring the patient is at the heart of all the 
NHS does, something that was certainly countered in this dataset, 
where the stripping of personhood dominated accounts.  
A difficulty arises therefore when clinicians operating in the NHS 
system, who enter it believing their own values are aligned with 
the NHS’, find that its practices are compromising the extent to 
which one can ‘live out’ their values. Indeed, one CP wonders how 
she can sustain her values in a system that is not enabling them 
but rather is taking them from her, despite having declared itself to 
be aiming for something entirely opposite.  
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The concept of moral injury becomes pertinent here. “Moral injury 
is the damage done to one’s conscience or moral compass when 
that person perpetrates, witnesses, or fails to prevent acts that 
transgress one’s own moral beliefs, values, or ethical code of 
conduct” (The Moral Injury Project, 2021, p. 1). The CPs are at 
risk of moral injury through the disruption to their belief in the 
NHS’s capacity to act in an ethical, and just, manner (Drescher et 
al., 2011). The failure of leadership to uphold principles when the 
stakes are so high, and the betrayal described by the CPs, 
implicates the BPS too.   
4.3.6. Research Questions 
Having discussed the key findings in relation to the literature, from 
which the research questions arose, we can consider the extent to 
which these have been answered. The reader is invited to 
consider these research questions as interconnected. 
1. What situations or experiences can make psychologists 
feel their personal or professional values are 
compromised?  
2. How do clinical psychologists experience conflicts 
between their values and institutional procedures, and 
how do they attempt to manage them? 
3. What is the nature of the conflict and how is it 
experienced? 
Witnessing care perceived to be substandard, dehumanising, and 
dictated by funding restrictions compromised the CPs in this study 
and their integrity. The pressure to engage with procedures which 
perpetuate culturally harmful narratives and practices further 
distressed these CPs, leaving them despondent and despairing 
the state of the system. Managing this was a challenge for most, 
they spoke of having to grab hold of whatever moments of good 
practice they were able to employ and find allies to keep their 
values alive. Commonly, the CPs reached a point in which they 
needed to distance themselves from the unfairness, unjustness 
they were noticing. Most of the CPs had left previous posts, or 
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were considering doing so, in an attempt to move into a position 
which allowed them to work in line with their values. Some felt it 
was inevitable they would need to leave the NHS, to be able to do 
work they could be proud of but also to support their own 
psychological wellbeing and protect themselves from transforming 
into something unrecognisable.  
 
4.4. Critical Evaluation of the Research 
 
The variety of qualitative approaches employed in research require 
diverse methods for assessing validity; Yardley's (2000) criteria are 
consistent with a critical realist positioning and are spoken to below.  
4.4.1. Sensitivity to Context 
This study has been contextualised through the existing MD 
literature, and in the NHS, a healthcare system unlike those found 
in previous studies, with its own stated core values. Working in 
services with powerful hierarchies, using medical models, 
encourages the individualisation of distress, clients’, and 
clinicians’. Attention to the intersecting social, relational, cultural, 
and power-based embodied experiences supports a more 
contextualised account. During analysis sensitivity to context was 
also sought though careful selection of quotations across the 
breadth of participants, their perspectives, and experiences.  
4.4.2. Commitment and Rigour 
Commitment to the project has been evidenced via my immersion 
in the subject matter and the literature base during the scoping 
review of Chapter One, and by gaining insights through empathic 
alignment with the participants. Engagement with the topic was 
enhanced experientially through my placements as a Trainee 
Clinical Psychologist, in settings not dissimilar to the participants’. 
Rigour has been demonstrated though the extensive process of 
carrying out a thematic analysis, detailed attention given to the 
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content of each interview. This TA was completed over a four-
month period, guided by formal and informal supervision, the latter 
being peer-led.  
4.4.3. Coherence and Transparency     
From design to completion, the research questions were returned 
to at every stage of the process in an attempt at attaining 
coherence of the thesis. Developing the themes through 
discussion with the supervisor also aided coherent identification of 
patterns and illustrating these with data extracts is an attempt to 
support the reader in sharing in this. I have attempted to present a 
transparent description of the analytic procedure in Chapter Two 
and the results of this in Chapter Three included verbatim 
extracts. I have also endeavoured to demonstrate the resultant 
themes via a range of participant accounts. Transparency is 
additionally demonstrated via researcher reflexivity, explored later 
in this chapter. 
Spencer and Ritchie (2011) provide additional principles by which 
we can review the study, and these follow:  
4.4.4. Credibility  
I attempted to ensure this study was plausible and credible by 
firstly presenting the proposal and rationale to clinical psychology 
colleagues in my network, who responded with interest and 
reported that the emotional experience of navigating ethical 
dilemmas was one they were often having to attend to alone, and 
out of working hours. An exploration of MD with CPs therefore 
appeared appropriate and relevant. A pilot interview with a fellow 
trainee CP confirmed that the concept of MD resonated, even at 
the trainee level. Discussions with clinical supervisors also 
provided space for reflections on the variety of ways in which MD 
could be experienced by CPs and supported the development of 
the interview schedule.  
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Regarding the credibility of the results, Braun and Clarke (2006) 
present criterion for conducting a ‘good’ TA, via a 15-point 
checklist. This criterion stretches across all stages of the process, 
from transcription to report writing, and I feel confident I have met 
each of these 15 points by, for example, producing themes that 
are distinctive and coherent (criteria 6), and born fundamentally 
from the data following an interpretative process (criteria 7). 
Although it is suggested one-word theme titles be avoided the 
priority is that titles be concise and suggestive of meaning, which I 
believe has been achieved despite ‘Power’ being such a one-word 
title – an organised story about the data follows (criteria 9), with 
language and concepts utilised (criteria 15) being consistent with 
a critical realist positioning (Braun & Clarke, 2021).  
4.4.5. Epistemology 
As per Willig (2019), I have sought to emphasise the importance 
of a coherent relationship between the study’s epistemological 
and methodological assumptions. A critical realist positioning 
facilitated contextualised accounts which considered the material 
reality of a CPs role and duty. For example, participants spoke to 
the reality of target-driven, resource-constrained service provision 
and these experiences were given more nuance when grounded 
in the socio-political context of a socialised healthcare system 
where power operates.  I acknowledge critiques of critical realism, 
including concerns around meaning being derived from the 
researcher’s perspective rather than the participants’ (Sims-
Schouten et al., 2007). To address this, transcripts have been 
revisited throughout the theme refinement process to ensure any 
analytic claim is grounded in the data and participants’ reports, 
whilst attending to the broader ‘socialised healthcare’ context.  
4.4.6. Analysis 
Thematic Analysis provided a flexibility that allowed me to address 
material and contextual issues within the themes, aligned with a 
critical realist position. It does however rely on participants 
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providing a ‘whole’ account of their experience; that which is not 
voiced cannot be analysed and incorporated into the overall 
understanding of MD produced.  
 
4.5. Research Strengths and Limitations 
4.5.1. Sample 
This study includes data from 14 CPs, operating in adult mental 
health settings at tier 2 or above. Each of their services, and their 
experiences, are situated in differing commissioning and local 
government contexts. Although I sought to recruit UK CPs, there 
is no representation from Northern Ireland or Scotland. Remote 
data collection however perhaps allowed those who would not 
normally have time to attend or to travel to participate; this also 
allowed for a broader geographic reach. Following the work of 
Guest et al. (2006) on saturation, Ando et al. (2014) also found 12 
interviews to be a sufficient sample size for identifying the key 
elements of a phenomenon, when conducting TA specifically. 
However, as these authors note in their study too, two of my 
participants opted to keep their camera off and it is not known the 
extent to which this will have influenced coding.  
Recruitment occurred via social media and word of mouth, which 
does limit the reach somewhat to people in those networks. We 
could assume that particular CPs would be attracted to engaging 
in a research project such as this, CPs who had an opinion on the 
topic and had ‘more’ experience of ethical dilemmas than most 
perhaps. Some participants did indeed express a hope that their 
engagement with the study could lead to changes in the 
profession, that this unspoken distress CPs are experiencing 
might be brought to the table for discussion, beyond how to 
manage ethical dilemmas to what is it like to be in systems where 
you are restrained from carrying out ‘best practice’ and acting with 
integrity. The invitation to participate in research, the framing of 
the study during recruitment, and the subsequent semi-structured 
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interview schedule does come together to create an artificial 
context through which questions and answers are positioned in a 
certain frame (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). However, asking 
participants about values conflicts did not enforce a moral 
framework, although it will have closed down other ways of talking 
about experiences (such as those less focused on the CP’s 
emotional experience and more on clinical management).  
Several CPs got in touch after coming across the recruitment 
poster but did not meet inclusion criteria as they no longer worked 
in the NHS; it would nonetheless be interesting to know what drew 
them to volunteer to participate, and this is perhaps something for 
future research to consider.  
Participants included nine women and five men, which 
approximately equates to the gender ratio in the UK clinical 
psychology profession (Baker & Nash, 2013). A representative 
sample regarding race and ethnicity was a more complex 
endeavour due to the risk of compromising confidentiality. It is well 
documented (Division of Clinical Psychology Racial and Social 
Inequalities in the Times of COVID-19 Working Group, 2020; 
Wood, 2020; Wood & Patel, 2017) that clinical psychology has a 
‘diversity problem’, particularly regarding Whiteness, and concerns 
about their ethnicity making them identifiable may have 
discouraged a number of UK CPs from responding to the 
recruitment advert. One participant indeed raised this concern, a 
query as to how I would protect her as one of the few Asian 
psychologists she knew of in the UK. I resolved to not present 
demographics in their totality; each participant’s gender, ethnicity, 
location etc. is not shared in conjunction with each other as when 
combined could make them identifiable. Demographic information 
is presented at the group level. Differences in race and ethnicity 
are not commented on within analysis or indeed this discussion, 
the sample size being too small for any meaningful distinctions to 
be made. However, it would be remiss of me to not consider how 
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the isolation participants described may be ten-fold for CPs who 
are already marginalised due to their race or ethnicity.  
4.5.2. Transcription  
Potter and Hepburn (2005) raise a concern regarding an inability 
for the wealth of human responses to be wholly captured through 
transcription. Through transcription we lose the expressions of 
emotion that aren’t voiced, that which is conveyed through tone 
and inflection, and the bodily movements suggestive of 
uncomfortableness or anxiety. I attempted to capture some of this 
by employing a form of transcription which noted gestures and 
halted speech but was aware when a few participants became 
tearful that I would struggle to fully encapsulate this in written 
form.  
4.5.3. Video Interviews 
As referenced above, two participants kept their cameras off, 
impacting my felt sense of rapport and ability to observe their 
reactions to questions. All had opportunities to withdraw, however.  
Participants were engaging with data collection from the comfort 
of their own homes, which we may assume provided greater 
safety and security for disclosure, as well as greater convenience. 
It is possible that had the interviews been conducted in-person, on 
work or university grounds, participants’ ability to name and speak 
on such distressing topics may have been impeded. Remotely 
conducting the interviews may also have helped to manage the 
trainee-qualified dynamic as we were in ‘neutral territory’.  
4.5.4. Generalisability  
Quantitative studies’ aim of generalisability is incompatible with 
the qualitative methodology of this research. As broad a range of 
CPs as accessible produced the themes in this study but due to 
the scarcity of comparable UK clinical psychology studies on MD 
we cannot confirm nor refute previous findings. These findings 
therefore serve to provide an illustration of how MD may present 
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in clinical psychology in the NHS and somewhat build upon 
previous MD research and wider discourses, in the context of 
institutionalised practices and procedures, to produce ‘vertical 
generalisability’ (Johnson, 1997). 
It is important to note that data collection took place August – 
October 2020, 6-9 months into the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Participants were working in NHS settings, experiencing the 
impact of COVID-19 on the delivery of healthcare and their ability 
to do their jobs, the adaptations required, and so their 
contributions are likely to have been influenced by this. 
Nevertheless, when participants did refer to COVID-19 they did so 
to point out that it had only exacerbated pre-existing systemic 
difficulties in their services.  
 
4.6. Contribution and Importance 
 
The value and relevance of a research project, its ability to advance 
theory, policy, and/or practice can be spoken to in terms of its 
contribution (Spencer & Ritchie, 2011). Considering the sample 
described above and the limits of generalisability, this study does not 
attempt to represent the MD experiences of all CPs working in the UK’s 
NHS. This is a relatively unexplored area with UK CPs and so I hope that 
by sharing the experiences of these 14 CPs in England and Wales the 
current study provides a valuable insight into what may be an important 
but largely unspoken difficulty in the profession.   
A ‘retention issue’ in the NHS is well known, and spoken to in Chapter 
One, but writing on this is predominantly focused upon nurses and 
physicians. A retention difficulty in clinical psychology is acknowledged 
far more anecdotally, less ‘research’ as to its causes conducted. This 
study may provide some understanding as to why CPs struggle to stay in 
posts, or in the NHS. The literature on staffing issues suggests that 
burnout, exhaustion, and depression – precipitated by working conditions 
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– cause clinicians to ‘quit’. Participants here reported similar 
experiences, an overwhelming tiredness developing out of a relentless 
fight to stay aligned with one’s values, battling a system that is 
constraining moral action, and the impact this has on their own 
psychological wellbeing. Systems in crisis ultimately produce workers in 
crisis. I hope this study also goes someway to acknowledge the 
significant impact that working in these systems has on its clinicians.  
It is evidently important that moral practitioners with vast clinical 
experience remain in our systems, disseminating their skills, to be 
utilised and valued by colleagues and clients. It seems an ethical 
imperative that the system, its leaders and associated professional 
bodies, try to retain ethically conscious clinicians for the benefit of 
patients. Perhaps things would improve if the NHS was able to live more 
completely up to its stated principles and values. 
MD may present differently in CPs than in other HCPs for a variety of 
reasons. As referenced in Chapter One, CPs have amassed frameworks 
for understanding – such as Social Identity Theory, deployed by one 
participant here – to support them in making sense of the distress their 
clients, but also they themselves, can experience. Their knowledge 
contributes to the power they hold, occupationally. However, the results 
of this study suggest that whilst this knowledge and power may provide 
the CPs with the means for understanding their experiences of MD, and 
how these have been systemically produced, their power was not 
sufficiently protective; it did not keep the MD at bay. Clinical psychology 
doctoral programmes additionally often train CPs to focus upon societal 
contexts and systems and so the awareness of being compromised 
regarding one’s ability to support social justice, for example, may be 
more in reach for CPs. Many doctoral courses also take up a political 
stance, although within the profession debates continue regarding how 
explicitly political, or neutral, the profession should be (for example, 
Rahim & Cooke, 2019; Randall, 2020).  
The broad conceptualisation and delineation of MD has not been directly 
dealt with in this study. What this study may add to our understanding of 
MD as a concept however concerns what happens when an 
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organisation, with moral roots (universal healthcare for all), compromises 
itself and in turn its workers. Working with an MD framework may be 
efficacious in that it brings the emotional experience of moral and ethical 
dilemmas to the fore, having identified that CPs are often not ‘allowed’ to 
do so, focusing more on the practical components of these, with little 
space for acknowledging that psychologists too need support. They are 
not the morally superior agents that situational judgement tests, for 
example, may suggest. Ideas about CPs taking on a ‘moral compass’ 
position and working to ‘do the right thing’ do imply some morally 
superior ideas about the profession, which may have been brought to the 
fore by myself as a researcher who is also an incoming CP. It is 
important to note therefore that a small number of participants did not 
describe themselves as morally distressed, however they were engaged 
with personal and professional detachment. This should not necessarily 
imply a bad or morally dubious fraction of CPs but rather connects to 
ideas about ‘good and bad’ systems and what it is like for HCPs to 
operate within them. Most people agree that the NHS is a fundamentally 
‘good’ system due to its core component being the provision of free 
healthcare, however it is also accused of being institutionally racist (NHS 
Race and Health Observatory, 2020), for example, and so a binary of 




Here I present three levels at which the current study may suggest 
recommendations for action, but I believe these levels are interactive and 
likely to influence one another  
4.7.1. Clinical 
The emotive aspect of ethical dilemma management, and the 
consequences of a negative experience of this, are significant 
enough to warrant more meaningful consideration in clinical 
practice. This may mean incorporating thoughts on this across the 
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breadth of a CP’s career, beginning with doctoral training 
programmes where explicit acknowledgment of the tension 
between organisational, clinical, and personal values and 
responsibilities might be helpful for attending to what can become 
‘divided loyalties’ for a CP. Increasing the awareness in clinical 
practice of such experiences, through a MD lens or otherwise, 
could help to foster collective thought and skill development, 
combatting the isolated experience the CPs described, framing 
the issue as the relational one it is, and helping CPs stay 
connected to their values together. This thread could continue 
through reflective practice, line management, and supervision, 
should the emotive component of these difficult decision-making 
tasks be given as much credence as the practicalities currently 
are.  
4.7.2. Research 
As the first study to explore MD with UK CPs, future researchers 
may wish to replicate this study, literally or through shared aims.  
Based on the questions I am left with following this study, our 
understanding of MD in clinical psychology might be furthered by 
an examination of what was only mildly touched on in this report – 
the differences in experiences described by the participants with 
significantly more experience; two participants had over 20 years’ 
experience, nine participants had 10 or less and there did seem to 
be some moderating factor at play, but I cannot speak to this 
specifically as it was not individually investigated.  
A comparison of MD experiences with CPs in the UK operating in 
organisations other than the NHS (such as charities) may also be 
of worth, potentially adding to our understanding of the operation 
of institutional constraints upon MD.  
The significant influence of multidisciplinary colleagues’ narratives 
and actions upon the CPs experience of ‘witnessing’ might also 
call for a study of how these dilemmas are spoken about within 
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teams, perhaps a conversational analysis, to look towards 
change-based interventions at the meso level.  
4.7.3. Policy 
At a more macro level, the CPs implicated the social care 
structure as hindering their ability to live and work by their values. 
Commissioning and government funding are also impacting upon 
what it is that CPs and their services can and cannot offer, leading 
to the ‘gaps and access’ issues. Some CPs suggested that clinical 
psychology should therefore be more concerned with lobbying 
practices, engaging with the fight for social justice, as it otherwise 
impedes individual therapeutic work. Other CPs however 
expressed not having the fight left in them for such ‘extra-
curriculars’, the current system not leaving any space for CPs to 
do more than their contracted contact hours and sessions. 
Nonetheless, (revived) environments which enable CPs to act in 
line with their values and ethics are perhaps the answer to 
combatting the powerlessness and despair that can take hold 
(Morgan et al., 2019). 
The Long Term Plan (NHS England, 2019) aims to address the 
issue of a ‘gap’ between primary and secondary care but mostly 
plans to do so by reorganising the current services, restructuring a 
struggling system rather than engaging in a deep, cultural reform. 
The reports of the CPs in this study suggest that the latter is 
warranted.  
The BPS may also wish to consider how its policies and guidance 
on ethical conduct and ethical decision-making are not held in 
mind by the CPs in this study to any significant degree; these 
participants were not drawing directly from BPS publications for 
support in managing such issues. The ‘messiness’ of a voluntary-
membership organisation setting the standard for UK CPs may not 
quickly nor easily be resolved, but with matters of ethics being so 
integral to the profession, and healthcare more broadly, this is 
certainly something that will need further thought.  
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4.8. Reflective Review 
 
This thesis as presented is a product of the researcher and must be 
viewed as such (Nightingale & Cromby, 1999; Willig, 2019).  
4.8.1. Personal Reflexivity 
I conducted this study as a Trainee CP with experience of NHS 
MH services and being somewhat in the profession, but as I 
completed analysis I drew closer to qualifying and more 
thoroughly taking up a place in the system I am critiquing.   
I had assumptions as to what I would hear from my almost-peers. 
I expected frustration and ideas about limited autonomy, providing 
prescriptive models for set amounts of time. The latter constraint 
arose minimally; most participants reported having clinical 
autonomy, being in control of what they deliver to a client, but this 
was not protective enough when they witnessed so many clients 
unable to get into the service and the clinical room in the first 
place, or make use of it once there. 
An interest in ethical decision-making had developed through my 
own experiences of working in services, as a support worker, an 
assistant practitioner, a psychological wellbeing practitioner, and 
as a trainee CP; across primary and secondary settings, inpatient 
and outpatient, that sense of not being able to help people in the 
way I wish I could was ever-present. It is of course somewhat 
demoralising to hear from my participants that it does not go away 
once I qualify, but also somewhat relieving to know my seniors 
can and do still resist and challenge the system when and where 
they can.  
The doctoral course itself furthered an approach which centres 
power and political influences upon the work of CPs. These 
experiences and lenses through which I conceptualise issues will 
have influenced my analysis, despite all attempts at rigour. I 
believe I remained aware of this throughout the research process 
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however and I was vigilant to the impact of my own assumptions, 
checking back to ensure interpretations linked to the data. 
Nonetheless, it was I who saw patterns in the data and named 
them, and so my subjective engagement with the data cannot be 
denied (Braun & Clarke, 2006).  
4.8.2. Power  
There are implicit power differentials between researcher and 
participant (Ringer, 2013), and for myself and the participants here 
there were particularly interesting, alternating power imbalances; I 
as the researcher held power, but as a trainee CP faced with 
qualified CPs power felt like it was exchanged between us at 
different stages of the research process. As an interviewee, 
participants may have felt a need to respond in the most helpful 
way for me, as qualified CPs being interviewed by a trainee they 
may have felt either self-assured or assessed. My impression was 
the former, most were relaxed and conversational, expanding and 
elaborating without prompting, often including humour. I note 
however a concern some participants voiced, not wanting to ‘put 
me off’ the profession; they were aware of my trainee status and 
the demands of a thesis and ending training too and so may in 
fact have held back some of their more severe or existential 
dilemmas in an attempt to protect me; an ironic moral principle 
invading this research space on MD.   
 
4.9. Concluding Comments  
 
MD is a well-researched topic within nursing literature, although debates 
about its conceptualisation remain. In this study MD was explored with 
Clinical Psychologists in the UK’s NHS for the first time. In this context 
ethical dilemmas arose in, and were complicated by, systemic difficulties 
in the NHS’s MH structure. Being in these services, observing and 
becoming enmeshed in culturally harmful practices leaves CPs conflicted 
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as to how to do the right thing, and just what that right thing is. The 
powerful hierarchies in these services are at times stifling, forcing 
compromise, and the CPs have to repeatedly find the will – the moral 
courage – to resist, but this comes with a cost. Participants’ relationship 
with their professional identity was threatened; they felt unsupported by 
their professional body with this distressing ethical problem, and to 
manage at times needed to morally disengage from their everyday 
working reality. The alternative for most was to change jobs, but an 
inevitable departure from the NHS loomed in many CP’s futures; this a 
painful decision but one the CPs felt was necessary for their personal 
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6.1. Appendix A: Literature Search Strategy 
 
The search criteria for this scoping review was determined by the 
contents of the narrative review and the inclusion criteria for this study. 
An initial search was performed across several databases to refine 
search terms. Using the keywords, published, peer-reviewed work was 
searched for across electronic databases associated with psychology, 
sociology, philosophy and ethics, and medicine. These databases 
included EBSCO (PsycInfo, PsychARTICLES, CINAHC); Academic 
Search Complete; and Google Scholar. The terms ‘moral distress’, 
‘psychology’, ‘burnout, ‘ethical dilemmas’, and ‘decision-making’ were 
used individually and in combination with one another. Following abstract 
readings, articles considered to be potentially relevant were obtained in 
their full text and incorporated into the review. Those considered relevant 
tended to speak to the emotional component of clinician’s experiences or 
considered the constructs and contexts that impacted upon these 
experiences. Citation searches were also carried out and the reference 
lists of key papers were hand-searched. The search took place between 
July 2020 and February 2021.  
A total of 5921 articles were identified through the search, 1156 were 
screened, 97 duplicates were removed, and 80 full texts accessed; 14 
articles remained and are spoken to in the scoping review. All papers 
identified by the search, meeting the inclusion criteria, were downloaded 
and organised using the reference management software Zotero. 
Reasons for exclusion included a sole focus on paediatric settings, 
exploration of MD outside of a healthcare context, not relating to clinical 
practice, being written in a language other than English, and full texts not 
being available. Theses and dissertations, unpublished, were also 
excluded. Due to the scarcity of literature examining the moral 
experience of clinical psychologists in the UK, papers speaking to this 
outside of the UK were included. Similar experiences may be described 
in papers not included, due to their publication in ‘grey literature’ for 
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example, however I sought to explore all literature dealing with the 
concept of moral distress itself.  
 
The questions guiding this scoping review were: 
• What current understanding of ‘moral distress’ in clinical practice 
is there? 
• What is the clinical psychology experience of ‘moral distress’? 
 
The following search terms were used concurrently with the terms “moral 
distress”, and/or “burnout” with the Boolean operators ‘AND’ and ‘OR’:  
• Psychology 
• Ethical dilemmas 
• Decision-making 
Limiters included: 
• Title and abstract only 
• English language only  
The following databases were used for the search: 
• EBSCO: PsychINFO, PsychARTICLES, Academic Search 
Complete, and CINAHL 
• Science Direct 
• Google Scholar 
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PARTICIPANT DEBRIEF SHEET 
‘Clinical psychologists and moral distress’. 
Thank you for participating in my research study on ‘clinical psychologists and 
moral distress’. This letter offers information that may be relevant in light of you 
having now taken part.   
What if you have been negatively affected by taking part? 
It is not anticipated that you will have been negatively affected by taking part in 
the research, and all reasonable steps have been taken to minimise potential 
harm. Nevertheless, it is still possible that participating may have been 
challenging, distressing or uncomfortable in some way. If you have been 
affected in any of those ways you may find the following resources helpful for 
obtaining information and support:  
➢ You can locate your local IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies) service online https://www.england.nhs.uk/mental-
health/adults/iapt/ or ask your GP to refer you 
➢ SANE: a UK-wide charity offering emotional support and information via 
their helpline, textcare, and online support forum http://www.sane.org.uk 
0300 304 7000 (4:30pm – 10:30pm daily) 
You are also very welcome to contact me or my supervisor if you have specific 
questions or concerns. 
Contact Details 
If you would like further information about my research or have any questions or 
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me.  
Kerrie Sprigings, email: u1616635@uel.ac.uk  
If you have any questions or concerns about how the research has been 
conducted please contact my research supervisor, Dr Kenneth Gannon, at the 
School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 
4LZ. Email: k.n.gannon@uel.ac.uk  
The Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee can 
also be contacted: Dr Tim Lomas, School of Psychology, University of East 











Semi-structured Interview Schedule 
 
‘Clinical psychology and moral distress’. 
 
Beginning the interview: revisiting consent, confidentiality, and right to withdraw. 
Set time limit and offer to answer any questions before proceeding.  
 
Your involvement with this study, and the data you provide, will remain 
confidential. Only my supervisor and I will have access to the data, and 
my supervisor will view your data only once it has been anonymised and 
you have been given a pseudonym. You have the right to withdraw from 
the study, and this interview, at any time and with no repercussions. I ask 
only that you withdraw before analysis of the data begins on February 1st 
2021. We have up to an hour allotted for today, do you have any 




o How long have you been a qualified clinical psychologist? 
o What adult mental health setting do you currently work in? 
o Do you have any managerial responsibility?  
o What comes to mind when you think about the professional values of 
clinical psychology? 
o Are these enshrined anywhere? 
o Can you tell me about the relationship between your own personal 




o During your career, have there been times you have been unable to 
provide the support you felt would be most ‘right’ or ethical? 
o Can you give me an example? 
o What was ‘getting in the way’? 
o What value or principle was compromised? 
o What was your emotional experience of this? 
o How did you resolve this? 
o Were you satisfied with the outcome? Why/why not? 
o Would ‘should’ have been done different? 
 
o Are there particular situations that arise in your workplace that 
compromise your values? 
o What is it like to experience this conflict between your values and the 
institution’s procedures? 





o Is your experience of being a clinical psychologist impacted by such 
ethical dilemmas? If yes, in what way? 
o To what extent do you draw on moral or ethical principles when making 
decisions about clinical care? 
o Do you think psychology colleagues do similarly? 
o On a day-to-day basis, what supports your ethical practice? 
o Where does the responsibility for ensuring psychology is ethical lie? 
o What amount of power to affect decisions would you say you have? 




























6.6. Appendix F: Transcription Notation Key 
 
(.) Pause 
(seconds) timing of significant pauses in number of seconds 
[inaudible] inaudible section of recording 
[laughter] laughter during the interview 
[text] clarifying information, context or interruptions 

























6.7. Appendix G: Ethical Application and Approval 
UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON 
School of Psychology 
 
APPLICATION FOR RESEARCH ETHICS APPROVAL 
FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN PARTICIPANTS 
(Updated October 2019) 
 
FOR BSc RESEARCH 
FOR MSc/MA RESEARCH 
FOR PROFESSIONAL DOCTORATE RESEARCH IN CLINICAL, 
COUNSELLING & EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY 
 
 
1. Completing the application 
 
1.1 Before completing this application please familiarise yourself with the British 
Psychological Society’s Code of Ethics and Conduct (2018) and the UEL Code 
of Practice for Research Ethics (2015-16). Please tick to confirm that you have 
read and understood these codes: 
    
1.2 Email your supervisor the completed application and all attachments as ONE 
WORD DOCUMENT. Your supervisor will then look over your application. 
 
1.3 When your application demonstrates sound ethical protocol, your supervisor will 
submit it for review. It is the responsibility of students to check this has been 
done.  
 
1.4 Your supervisor will let you know the outcome of your application. Recruitment 
and data collection must NOT commence until your ethics application has been 
approved, along with other research ethics approvals that may be necessary (see 
section 8). 
 
1.5 Please tick to confirm that the following appendices have been completed. Note: 
templates for these are included at the end of the form. 
 
- The participant invitation letter    
 
- The participant consent form  
 









1.6 The following attachments should be included if appropriate:  
 
- Risk assessment forms (see section 6) 
- A Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) certificate (see section 7) 
- Ethical clearance or permission from an external organisation (see section 8) 
- Original and/or pre-existing questionnaire(s) and test(s) you intend to use  
- Interview protocol for qualitative studies 
- Visual material(s) you intend showing participants. 
 
2. Your details 
 
2.1 Your name: Kerrie Sprigings 
 
2.2 Your supervisor’s name: Dr Kenneth Gannon 
 
2.3 Title of your programme: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
2.4 UEL assignment submission date (stating both the initial date and the resit date): 
May 2021 
 
3. Your research 
 
Please give as much detail as necessary for a reviewer to be able to fully understand the 
nature and details of your proposed research. 
 
3.1 The title of your study: ‘Clinical psychology and moral distress’. 
 
3.2 Your research question:  
 
What situations or experiences can make psychologists feel their personal or 
professional values are compromised?  
How do clinical psychologists experience conflicts between their values and 
institutional procedures and how do they attempt to manage them? 
 
3.3 Design of the research: qualitative methodology will be employed in order to 
gather in-depth accounts of individual perspectives on the research questions.  
 
3.4 Participants: participants will be qualified clinical psychologists working in 
adult mental health services. 
 
3.5 Recruitment: snowball sampling will be employed for recruitment. The study 
will be advertised on social media platforms with requests for relevant networks 
to share it onward, and also sent to personal social networks for distribution. 
Participant Information Sheets will be sent to any interested party by email; 
these include my email address and prospective participants will be encouraged 





3.6 Measures, materials or equipment: due to the current COVID-19 situation and 
social distancing measures, interviews will take place via video call on 
Microsoft Teams and so a laptop or smartphone will be required. Interviews can 
be recorded within Teams and also, as a back-up, onto a password-protected 
Dictaphone. These files will be then be transferred to and stored on a password-
protected computer in encrypted folders. They will be backed-up and saved to 
my University of East London OneDrive cloud storage account. If required and 
if possible a transcription pedal will be obtained from the University’s 
Psychology department technicians. The software programme ‘NVivo’ will aid 
organising coding during analysis.  
 
3.7 Data collection: semi-structured interviews will be conducted on a one-to-one 
basis, lasting approximately one hour each. They will take place remotely, as 
described above; I will offer to hold interviews over the phone, should 
participants not wish to attend a video call. Participants will be asked to recall a 
clinical case and a decision they/the team had to make regarding an ethical 
dilemma, to ground the discussion and questions in a concrete context.   
 
3.8 Data analysis: thematic analysis will be employed for the interpretation of 
participants’ data, seeking to identify any patterns or themes within their 
interviews in order to answer the research question. I will follow the Braun and 
Clarke (2006) process for coding.  
 
4. Confidentiality and security 
 
It is vital that data are handled carefully, particularly the details about participants. 
For information in this area, please see the UEL guidance on data protection, and also 
the UK government guide to data protection regulations. 
 
4.1 Will participants data be gathered anonymously? No.  
 
4.2 If not (e.g., in qualitative interviews), what steps will you take to ensure their 
anonymity in the subsequent steps (e.g., data analysis and dissemination)?  
 
Participants will be advised that they are not required to answer all questions 
during the interview if they do not wish to. During transcription all participants 
will be given pseudonyms and no identifying information will be kept once 
analysis begins.  
 
4.3 How will you ensure participants details will be kept confidential?  
 
Participant names and contact details will be stored separately and securely from 
the audio files and transcripts and password protected.  Names and contact 
details will be retained until the analysis has begun and then will be permanently 
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deleted.  They will not be linked with the analysis and will not appear in any 
outputs, including the thesis.   
 
4.4 How will the data be securely stored?  
 
The audio recordings and the transcriptions will be stored in password-protected 
files on a password-protected computer and password-protected cloud storage – 
OneDrive, University of East London account. Recordings will be transferred 
from the Dictaphone to the computer and OneDrive immediately after each 
interview and will then be deleted from the Dictaphone. Once the thesis has 
been submitted and examined the recordings will be securely deleted and only 
the anonymised transcripts retained. 
 
4.5 Who will have access to the data?  
 
Myself, and my research supervisor Dr Kenneth Gannon, will be the only people 
able to access the data. However, Dr Gannon will see the data only in its 
anonymised form.  
 
4.6 How long will data be retained for?  
 
All transcripts will be destroyed two years after submission of the thesis; other 
data will have been deleted before this (see above).  
 
5. Informing participants                                                                                     
 
Please confirm that your information letter includes the following details:  
 
5.1 Your research title: 
 
5.2 Your research question: 
 
5.3 The purpose of the research: 
 
5.4 The exact nature of their participation. This includes location, duration, and the 
tasks etc. involved: 
 
5.5 That participation is strictly voluntary: 
 
5.6 What are the potential risks to taking part: 
 
5.7 What are the potential advantages to taking part: 
 
5.8 Their right to withdraw participation (i.e., to withdraw involvement at any point, 












5.9 Their right to withdraw data (usually within a three-week window from the time 
of their participation): 
 
5.10 How long their data will be retained for: 
 
5.11 How their information will be kept confidential: 
 
5.12 How their data will be securely stored: 
 
5.13 What will happen to the results/analysis: 
 
5.14 Your UEL contact details: 
 
5.15 The UEL contact details of your supervisor: 
 
 
Please also confirm whether: 
 
5.16 Are you engaging in deception? If so, what will participants be told 
about the nature of the research, and how will you inform them about its real 
nature. NO 
 
5.17 Will the data be gathered anonymously? If NO what steps will be taken 
to ensure confidentiality and protect the identity of participants?  
 
Please see 4.3 to 4.6 above 
 
5.18 Will participants be paid or reimbursed? If so, this must be in the form of 
redeemable vouchers, not cash. If yes, why is it necessary and how much will it 
be worth? NO 
 
6. Risk Assessment 
 
Please note: If you have serious concerns about the safety of a participant, or others, 
during the course of your research please see your supervisor as soon as possible. If 
there is any unexpected occurrence while you are collecting your data (e.g. a 
participant or the researcher injures themselves), please report this to your supervisor 
as soon as possible. 
 
6.1 Are there any potential physical or psychological risks to participants related to 
taking part? If so, what are these, and how can they be minimised?  
The topic of the interviews may be an emotive one, which may cause some 
emotional distress, however I am being transparent about what we will be 
discussing and so participants should not be caught off guard and by collecting 










and cease the interview if I suspect it may be too difficult, or offer breaks if that 
would be helpful. 
 
6.2 Are there any potential physical or psychological risks to you as a researcher?  If 
so, what are these, and how can they be minimised?  
When asked to discuss a specific ethical dilemma they have faced during their 
interview what a participant shares may be emotional distressing for me to hear. 
I will seek to manage this through supervision.  
 
6.3 Have appropriate support services been identified in the debrief letter? If so, 
what are these, and why are they relevant?  
The debrief letter includes weblink for locating local IAPT services and the 
SANE helpline. The information for an organisation that supports clinical 
psychologists with lived experience of poor mental health will be added if 
permission granted by the group.  
 
6.4 Does the research take place outside the UEL campus? If so, where?  
 
Data collection is occurring remotely, online via video calls and telephone  
 
If so, a ‘general risk assessment form’ must be completed. This is included 
below as appendix 4. Note: if the research is on campus, or is online only, this 
appendix can be deleted. If a general risk assessment form is required for this 
research, please tick to confirm that this has been completed:  
 
6.5 Does the research take place outside the UK? If so, where? No. 
 
If so, in addition to the ‘general risk assessment form’, a ‘country-specific risk 
assessment form’ must be also completed (available in the Ethics folder in the 
Psychology Noticeboard), and included as an appendix. If that applies here, 
please tick to confirm that this has been included:  
 
 However, please also note: 
 
- For assistance in completing the risk assessment, please use the AIG Travel 
Guard website to ascertain risk levels. Click on ‘sign in’ and then ‘register here’ 
using policy # 0015865161. Please also consult the Foreign Office travel advice 
website for further guidance.  
- For on campus students, once the ethics application has been approved by a 
reviewer, all risk assessments for research abroad must then be signed by the 
Head of School (who may escalate it up to the Vice Chancellor).   
- For distance learning students conducting research abroad in the country where 
they currently reside, a risk assessment must be also carried out. To minimise 
risk, it is recommended that such students only conduct data collection on-line. 





to be signed by the Head of School. However, if not deemed low risk, it must be 
signed by the Head of School (or potentially the Vice Chancellor). 
- Undergraduate and M-level students are not explicitly prohibited from 
conducting research abroad. However, it is discouraged because of the 
inexperience of the students and the time constraints they have to complete their 
degree. 
 
7. Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) certificates 
 
7.1 Does your research involve working with children (aged 16 or under) or 
vulnerable adults (*see below for definition)? 
 
                   YES / NO 
 
7.2 If so, you will need a current DBS certificate (i.e., not older than six 
months), and to include this as an appendix. Please tick to confirm 
that you have included this: 
 
 Alternatively, if necessary for reasons of confidentiality, you may  
 email a copy directly to the Chair of the School Research Ethics  
 Committee. Please tick if you have done this instead: 
 
Also alternatively, if you have an Enhanced DBS clearance (one  
you pay a monthly fee to maintain) then the number of your  
Enhanced DBS clearance will suffice. Please tick if you have  
included this instead: 
 
7.3 If participants are under 16, you need 2 separate information letters,  
consent form, and debrief form (one for the participant, and one for  
their parent/guardian). Please tick to confirm that you have included  
these: 
 
7.4 If participants are under 16, their information letters consent form,  
and debrief form need to be written in age-appropriate language.  
Please tick to confirm that you have done this 
 
* You are required to have DBS clearance if your participant group involves (1) 
children and young people who are 16 years of age or under, and (2) ‘vulnerable’ people 
aged 16 and over with psychiatric illnesses, people who receive domestic care, elderly 
people (particularly those in nursing homes), people in palliative care, and people living 
in institutions and sheltered accommodation, and people who have been involved in the 
criminal justice system, for example. Vulnerable people are understood to be persons 
who are not necessarily able to freely consent to participating in your research, or who 
may find it difficult to withhold consent. If in doubt about the extent of the vulnerability 
of your intended participant group, speak to your supervisor. Methods that maximise the 
       
       





understanding and ability of vulnerable people to give consent should be used whenever 
possible. For more information about ethical research involving children click here.  
 
8. Other permissions 
 
9. Is HRA approval (through IRAS) for research involving the NHS required? 
Note: HRA/IRAS approval is required for research that involves patients or 
Service Users of the NHS, their relatives or carers as well as those in receipt of 
services provided under contract to the NHS. 
9.1   
 
 YES / NO         If yes, please note: 
 
- You DO NOT need to apply to the School of Psychology for ethical clearance if 
ethical approval is sought via HRA/IRAS (please see further details here).  
- However, the school strongly discourages BSc and MSc/MA students from 
designing research that requires HRA approval for research involving the NHS, 
as this can be a very demanding and lengthy process. 
- If you work for an NHS Trust and plan to recruit colleagues from the Trust, 
permission from an appropriate manager at the Trust must be sought, and HRA 
approval will probably be needed (and hence is likewise strongly discouraged). 
If the manager happens to not require HRA approval, their written letter of 
approval must be included as an appendix.  
- IRAS approval is not required for NHS staff even if they are recruited via the 
NHS (UEL ethical approval is acceptable). However, an application will still 
need to be submitted to the HRA in order to obtain R&D approval.  This is in 
addition to a separate approval via the R&D department of the NHS Trust 
involved in the research. *This is what I will be doing  
- IRAS approval is not required for research involving NHS employees when data 
collection will take place off NHS premises, and when NHS employees are not 
recruited directly through NHS lines of communication. This means that NHS 
staff can participate in research without HRA approval when a student recruits 
via their own social or professional networks or through a professional body like 
the BPS, for example. 
  
9.2 Will the research involve NHS employees who will not be directly recruited 
through the NHS, and where data from NHS employees will not be collected on 
NHS premises?   
           
YES / NO 
 
9.3 If you work for an NHS Trust and plan to recruit colleagues from the Trust, will 
permission from an appropriate member of staff at the Trust be sought, and will 
HRA be sought, and a copy of this permission (e.g., an email from the Trust) 




YES / NO 
 
9.4 Does the research involve other organisations (e.g. a school, charity, workplace, 
local authority, care home etc.)? If so, please give their details here. 
 
Furthermore, written permission is needed from such organisations if they are 
helping you with recruitment and/or data collection, if you are collecting data on 
their premises, or if you are using any material owned by the 
institution/organisation. If that is the case, please tick here to confirm that you 
have included this written permission as an appendix:   
 
                                                                                                                                                   
Please note that even if the organisation has their own ethics committee and 
review process, a School of Psychology SREC application and approval is still 
required. Ethics approval from SREC can be gained before approval from 
another research ethics committee is obtained. However, recruitment and data 
collection are NOT to commence until your research has been approved by the 




Declaration by student: I confirm that I have discussed the ethics and feasibility of this 
research proposal with my supervisor. 
                                                                                            
Student's name (typed name acts as a signature):  KERRIE SPRIGINGS 
                                                                                
Student's number:                                Date: 15/07/2020 
 















School of Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
NOTICE OF ETHICS REVIEW DECISION 
 
For research involving human participants 




REVIEWER: Hebba Haddad 
 
SUPERVISOR: Kenneth Gannon     
 
STUDENT: Kerrie Sprigings      
 
Course: Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
 
Title of proposed study: Clinical psychology and moral distress 
 
 
DECISION OPTIONS:  
 
1. APPROVED: Ethics approval for the above named research study has been granted from 
the date of approval (see end of this notice) to the date it is submitted for 
assessment/examination. 
 
2. APPROVED, BUT MINOR AMENDMENTS ARE REQUIRED BEFORE THE 
RESEARCH COMMENCES (see Minor Amendments box below): In this circumstance, 
re-submission of an ethics application is not required but the student must confirm with 
their supervisor that all minor amendments have been made before the research 
commences. Students are to do this by filling in the confirmation box below when all 
amendments have been attended to and emailing a copy of this decision notice to her/his 
supervisor for their records. The supervisor will then forward the student’s confirmation 
to the School for its records.  
 
3. NOT APPROVED, MAJOR AMENDMENTS AND RE-SUBMISSION REQUIRED (see 
Major Amendments box below): In this circumstance, a revised ethics application must 
be submitted and approved before any research takes place. The revised application will 
be reviewed by the same reviewer. If in doubt, students should ask their supervisor for 
support in revising their ethics application.  
 
DECISION ON THE ABOVE-NAMED PROPOSED RESEARCH STUDY 





Minor amendments required (for reviewer): 
 
3.4 – (roughly) how many participants?  
 






Confirmation of making the above minor amendments (for students): 
 
I have noted and made all the required minor amendments, as stated above, before 
starting my research and collecting data. 
 
Student’s name (Typed name to act as signature): Kerrie Sprigings  
Student number:      
 
Date:        01.08.2020 
 
(Please submit a copy of this decision letter to your supervisor with this box completed, 
if minor amendments to your ethics application are required) 
 
 
        
ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO RESEACHER (for reviewer) 
 




Please request resubmission with an adequate risk assessment 
 
If the proposed research could expose the researcher to any of kind of emotional, 





Please do not approve a high risk application and refer to the Chair of Ethics. Travel to 
countries/provinces/areas deemed to be high risk should not be permitted and an 
application not approved on this basis. If unsure please refer to the Chair of Ethics. 
 
 














Reviewer (Typed name to act as signature):   Hebba Haddad  
 
Date:  22.07.20 
 
This reviewer has assessed the ethics application for the named research study on behalf of the 













PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
‘Clinical psychology and moral distress’. 
 
You are being invited to participate in a research study. Before you agree it is 
important that you understand what your participation would involve. Please 
take some time to read the following information carefully.   
Who am I? 
I am a postgraduate student and Trainee Clinical Psychologist in the School of 
Psychology at the University of East London and I am studying for a 
Professional Doctorate in Clinical Psychology. As part of my studies I am 
conducting the research you are being invited to participate in. 
What is the research? 
I am conducting research exploring clinical psychologists’ experiences of ethical 
dilemmas in their practice. 
Why have you been asked to participate?  
You have been invited to participate in my research as you are a clinical 
psychologist working in adult mental health in the UK. I am not looking for 
‘experts’ on the topic of ethics, you will not be judged or personally analysed in 
any way, and you will be treated with respect.  
What will your participation involve? 
If you agree to participate, we would carry out an interview which would last 
approximately one hour. The interview is intended to be similar in manner to an 
informal conversation but will be audio recorded. You will be asked to recall 
clinical cases where you or your team faced an ethical dilemma; I will then ask 
you questions regarding your experience of this.  
Due to the COVID-19 restrictions, interviews will take place over Microsoft 
Teams. 
Will what you say remain confidential? 
Yes, your privacy and safety will be prioritised. The interview will be audio-
recorded and transcribed, and in the transcript you will be given a pseudonym. 
You are not required to answer all questions asked and you can stop the 
interview at any time. In the event you tell me that you or someone else is at 
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risk of harm I may need to let someone else (e.g. my supervisor) know but, if 
possible, I would try to discuss this with you first.   
What will happen to the information that you provide? 
The audio recording and the transcripts will be stored in password-protected 
files on a password-protected computer and password-protected Cloud storage 
- OneDrive. No-one other than my supervisor will have access to these files, 
and they will not know your name. When I write my thesis, I may use quotes 
from your interview but you will only be referred to by a pseudonym and nothing 
that might identify you will be included; the same will apply to any subsequent 
articles or reports published. 
Your name and contact details will be stored separately (and securely) from the 
audio files and transcripts; these files will be destroyed two years after the 
completion of the study. The data gathered for this study will be retained in 
accordance with the University’s Data Protection Policy.  
What if you want to withdraw? 
You will be free to leave the interview at any time and may also ask any 
questions throughout the process. There is the potential for some distress, were 
you to find the topic of discussion difficult, however I aim to support you during 
the process and it is hoped your participation may help to increase our 
understanding of the topic whilst providing an interesting opportunity to talk 
about your views. 
You should not feel under any obligation to take part in this study and are free 
to withdraw from the research at any time without explanation, disadvantage or 
consequence. However, I must ask that you contact me to withdraw before 
analysis of the data begins on 1st February 2021. 
My research has been approved by the School of Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee. This means that my research follows the standard of research 
ethics set by the British Psychological Society.  
 
Contact details 
If you would like further information about my research or have any questions or 
concerns, please do not hesitate to contact me: 
Kerrie Sprigings, email: u1616635@uel.ac.uk 
If you have any questions or concerns about how the research has been 
conducted please contact my research supervisor, Dr Kenneth Gannon, at the 
School of Psychology, University of East London, Water Lane, London E15 
4LZ. Email: k.n.gannon@uel.ac.uk 
The Chair of the School of Psychology Research Ethics Sub-committee can 
also be contacted: Dr Tim Lomas, School of Psychology, University of East 









CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE 
‘Clinical psychology and moral distress’. 
Please tick to confirm you have read and understand the following:  
I have the read the information sheet relating to the above research study and have 
been given a copy to keep. The nature and purposes of the research have been 
explained to me, and I have had the opportunity to discuss the details and ask 
questions about this information. I understand what is being proposed and the 
procedures in which I will be involved have been explained to me. 
I understand that my involvement in this study, and particular data from this research, 
will remain strictly confidential. Only the researcher(s) involved in the study will have 
access to identifying data. It has been explained to me what will happen once the 
research study has been completed. 
I hereby freely and fully consent to participate in the study which has been fully 
explained to me. Having given this consent I understand that I have the right to 
withdraw from the study at any time without disadvantage to myself and without 
being obliged to give any reason. I also understand that should I withdraw after 
analysis of the data has begun, the researcher reserves the right to use my anonymous 
data. 
 
Participant’s name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
………………………………………………………………………………………. 
Participant’s signature  
……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
Researcher’s name (BLOCK CAPITALS)  
KERRIE SPRIGINGS 
















6.11. Appendix K: List of Codes 
     Codes  
Obligation BPS guidelines 
Responsibility HCPC registration 
Idea of CPs a moral BPS ineffective org 
Learning experiences narrative Frustration with BPS 
Professions track record BPS Code of Ethics, binding? 
Ethics is taboo, political BPS as authority, yet voluntary membership  
No cohesion, individual readings Problematic; messy 
Dilemma in the profession Leadership confusion and dissatisfaction  
Psychology prescribers  Uncomfortable changes in profession 
Force/coercion to be something other CPs as cheap psychiatrists, handmaidens  
  
Integrity  Want to help 
Respect Authenticity, genuineness 
Do no harm Advocacy  
Confidentiality  Valuing personhood 
Trustworthiness Seeing humanity 
Accessibility  Honesty 
Person-centred care Reflection 
Therapeutic relationship Competent decision-making 
Adherence to guidelines Evidence-based practice 
Doing the right thing Kindness and compassion 
Collaboration Client as expert 
Diversity  Critical lens (NICE, diagnostics) 
Socialism   
  
Need for change from the top Waiting lists 
Overwhelmed  MDT culture 
Traumatised systems Under-resourced 
Ethics out of mind Services not for service-users 
Medical model Psychiatric power and influence  
Unethical practice of others Inflexible thinking  
Stuck-ness, repetition Dis/trust within MDT 
Cultural norms & harming Dilemmas in system; dilemmas between people  
ECT On your own, isolated, lone fighter 
Litigious society and defensive practice Consequences for patients 
Change unwanted, threatening, resisted  Impact on sense of job & profession 
Crisis Management mandate 
Patients not humans The unconscious at work 
Practice as taught Dysfunctional systems  
Fight Service’s moral compass 
Advocate  Marginalisation  
Predict, expect conflict Witnessing unethical practice / non-evidence decisions 
Power imbalances Patient exp of power 
Splits Causality and formulation tensions 
Concrete ceiling  Preference for shortcuts 
Whistle-blower’s unwanted Mistreatment of patients  
Angry management  Outdated  
Covertness  Ethical high road not taken 
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Deprivation Reciprocal attacks  
Aggression  NICE guidelines  
NHS machine Compromising decisions 
COVID as exacerbator Manage pressure by implementing barriers 
Social care Maslow’s hierarchy 




Betrayal Trying your best 
Not sustainable Just survive, carry on  
Embarrassed Detach, cut off, to manage 
Ethical pull to keep going Distance for self-preservation 
Pressure to conform Fight 
Faceless, invisible, voiceless Exhausting  
Unjust Cruel, unfair 
Sadness Anger 
Letting patient down Disheartening  
Guilt Scared  
Compassion burnout Over values overshadowed 
Moderating self, outrage, behaviour Family & relationships suffer 
Anxiety, physically felt Shouted down  
Rejection  Dread, premonitions 
Signed off, stress Nothing changes, left empty 
Painful, uncomfortable Worry  
Horrible, crap Demoralising  
Tearful  Mortifying, but reality  
Cognitive dissonance  Slog 
Intent to leave NHS Draw of private practice 
Reality/state of NHS Leadership posts 
Not sustainable Accumulative effect  
NHS business model Neo-liberal ideas 
Fight Cog in a machine 
Values not enabled, taken away Hope for new generation  
Collusion  Practice at odds with values 
Keep trying, or leave NHS bad for own mental health 
Experience of Trust NHS as identity marker 
Awareness of privilege Survivor’s guilt (class) 
Depressing Deflating 
Fear of who may become NHS years like dog year 
Not CP thought they’d be Hard to speak on 
NHS takes vs NHS gives Tipping point, walk away 
Wield power in line with values  Jump on opportunities to work in values 
ACT; CFT; social identity theory  Hold onto little wins/golden moments  
Values-based approach Recheck, rebalance, reconnect 
Confidence building Standing ground 
Channel anger, make things better Find allies 
Small, local, change Witness psychology working 
Naughty, bend rules  Boundaries of what CPs ‘supposed’ to do 
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